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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VALUES
WILLIAM

N.

ESKRIDGE, JR.*

Judicial invocation of legislative history to interpret federal statutes
has grown like weeds in a vacant lot during the last hundred years.
American courts and commentators for most of the nineteenth century
followed the "English Rule" that, "for the purpose of ascertaining the
intention of the legislature, no extrinsic fact, prior to the passage of the
bill, which is not itself a rule of law or an act of legislation, can be inquired into or in any way taken into view."' By the 1890s, a number of
American judges and commentators came to believe -that "[tlhe proceedings of the legislature in reference to the passage of an act," mainly com'2
mittee reports, "may be taken into consideration in construing the act."
Reliance on such materials grew more widespread in the twentieth century. A leading commentator reported the apparent consensus view in
1940 that "close consideration of extrinsic aids," including committee
reports, floor debate, and the evolution of the bill, "is today the dominant
feature of the interpretive technique employed by federal judges." 3 Since
World War II, citation of such material has become commonplace in the
federal courts. By 1982, it could be said that "[n]o occasion for statutory
construction now exists when the [Supreme] Court will not look at the
legislative history," including committee hearings, nonpublic documents,
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. Davidson College, 1973; M.A.
Harvard University, 1974; J.D. Yale University, 1978. I am grateful to Dan Ernst, Dan Farber, Phil
Frickey, and Dick Posner for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Randy Collins, Dixon
Osburn, and Bob Schoshinski provided excellent research assistance.
1. T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND

APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1857); see id. at 241 (courts cannot
"receive evidence of extrinsic facts as to the intention of the legislature; that is, of facts which have
taken place at the time of, or prior to, the passage of the bill"); F. DWARRIs, A GENERAL TREATISE
ON STATUTES AND THEIR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 143- 45 (1871) (with American Notes & Addi-

tions by Justice Platt Potter) (no mention of role for legislative history in construing statutes, obviously influenced by English practice); G. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES (1888) (similar; treatise was "founded" on the prior treatise of Sir Peter Benson Maxwell); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 380 (1891)

[hereinafter J.

SUTHERLAND (lst ed.)] (although goal of statutory interpretation is to seek out the legislature's
intent, "extrinsic" evidence of the view of individual legislators is not admissible).
2. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 879 (J. Lewis ed., 2d ed.
1904) [hereinafter J. SUTHERLAND (2d ed.)].

3. Jones, ExtrinsicAids in the FederalCourts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 737 (1940) [hereinafter
Extrinsic Aids]; see de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. REV.
527 (1940); Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof FederalStatutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939) (hereinafter Plain Meaning Rule]; Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic Evidence, 20 B.U.L. REV. 601 (1940).
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and even oxymoronic "subsequent legislative history." '4
The conventional story about the Supreme Court's use of legislative
history in the olden days is that not much was readily available; the
Court didn't use much of what was available; and the commentators approved of an emphasis on statutory text and of the Court's general disregard of "extrinsic" sources. Over time, legislative history has become
more plentiful and accessible, and both the Court and commentators
have increasingly emphasized it as a useful aid to statutory interpretation. This is, the conventional wisdom goes, a pretty good thing, so long
as the Court uses legislative history "critically"-that is, the Court is not
tricked by the occasionally manipulative history (the planned colloquy,
the packed committee report, the staged hearings).
The conventional story is an oversimplification of the evolution of
judicial and academic attitudes toward legislative history. To begin with,
the suggestion of a progressive historical march toward using whatever
reliable legislative history is available subordinates the doubts about the
use of legislative history that even its supporters have had, as well as the
substantial opposition to the use of legislative history at various points in
its climb to prominence. 5 Indeed, judicial and academic resistance to the
use of legislative history is increasing. 6 Although the Court does rely on
legislative history more often now than it did 40 years ago, there is no
reason to believe that the Court will rely on such history nearly as much
7
40 years from now.
Additionally, the intellectual structure by which the Court and commentators justify the relevance of legislative history has evolved over
time. There has been some change, of emphasis at least, in the values
that legislative history is viewed as serving, and these supposed values are
4. Wald, Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term,
68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1982); see also Carro & Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294 (1982) (over 40-year period,
Supreme Court reliance on legislative history increased almost geometrically).
5. Justices Holmes (1902-30), Brandeis (1916-38), Jackson (1938-55), and Scalia (1986- ) have
all raised serious objections to the use of legislative history from within the Court.
6. Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
7. Or even four years from now. There is some movement on the Court toward less reliance
on legislative history, gratia Justices Scalia. In the 1986 Term, when Justice Scalia began his service,
the Court found a statutory "plain meaning" in 28 statutory cases, and in 18 of those cases (over
three-fifths of those cases) examined the legislative history notwithstanding the apparently clear text;
in at least seven cases, the court trumped the apparent plain meaning of the statute, at least in part
by relying on legislative history. Contrast the 1988 Term, when Justice Scalia was joined by Justice
Kennedy: the Court found plain meaning in 32 statutory cases, yet only looked at the legislative
history in 11 (about a third); in only four cases did the Court displace an apparently plain meaning
by reference to legislative history. Eskridge, supra note 6, at 657 (table 1).
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linked up to different jurisprudential assumptions. This article will explore the evolution of legislative history theories by tracing the rise and
critiques of three different values theorists have found in legislative
history.
The early justifications for relying on legislative history emphasized
its authority value, that is, its value in telling us what the sovereign legislature has commanded of us. As a matter of interpretive rhetoric, the
interpreter asks the legislative history to tell what the "specific intent" of
the legislature was when it passed the statute. The value underlying legislative history as evidence of specific intent was subjected to critique by
the Legal Realists and their intellectual relatives early in this century.
Part I of this article traces the intellectual roots of legislative history's
authority value and outlines the Realist critiques, as updated by modem
theory.
Some of the Realists and scholars of the emerging Legal Process
School, responding to these critiques, developed a different theory in the
late 1930s and 1940s. This theory emphasized the purpose value of legislative history, its ability to suggest statutory goals and purposes, so that
the interpreter can better apply the statute to new situations. As a matter
of interpretive rhetoric, the Court seeks from the legislative history the
"general intent" of Congress when it passed the statute. Legislative history as evidence of general intent has been the leading academic defense
and has been routinely invoked by the Court (especially since the 1940s),
but it has itself been subjected to critique in the 1970s and 1980s. Part II
of this article explores the morphogenesis and critique of legislative history's purpose value.
We are now moving into an era, in which no single theory currently
dominates academic discussion of legislative history. On the one hand
the New Textualism builds upon Legal Realist and Law and Economics
critiques to urge the substantial abandonment of legislative history as a
source of guidance in statutory interpretation. On the other hand,
Normativist scholars suggest that legislative history, if examined critically, has a truth value. That is, the interpreter can learn much from the
legislative history about the "best" answer that can be quarried from the
statute. As a matter of interpretive rhetoric, the interpreter seeks from
the legislative history the "meta-intent," or background assumptions,
which can then be applied and updated in the current case. Legislative
history as evidence of meta-intent is a response to the problems with earlier theories, and it seeks to turn the problems with earlier theories to
productive advantage. The Court has not consciously adopted this rhetoric, but the truth value is implicit in many of its opinions. Part III
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explores this newest twist in legislative history theory, as well as inherent
problems with the newer theories.
The analysis in this article is of more than historical interest, because all three values of legislative history influence the Supreme Court's
current practice in statutory interpretation. I shall explore this idea
through a recent Supreme Court decision, Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Company.8 The relevant statute is Rule 609(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which in 1989 provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
The plaintiff, Paul Green, sued defendant Bock Laundry for providing
allegedly inadequate instructions for the use of its laundry dryer. Bock
Laundry impeached Green's testimony at trial, inter alia, by referring to
his felony convictions, and Green appealed the defendant's verdict on
this and other grounds.
Green argued that it was unjust to admit evidence of his prior felony
convictions without considering whether their slight probative value was
outweighed by their considerable prejudicial value. Bock Laundry argued that Rule 609(a)(1) precluded any such balancing, except when a
defendant's prior convictions were at issue (Green, of course, was a plaintiff). The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens,
conceded that Rule 609(a)(1) was a strange-looking rule of evidence.
The Rule seemed to treat plaintiffs and defendants differently in civil
cases: so long as they are not crimen falsi (convictions involving untruthfulness, covered by Rule 609(a)(2)), defendants could exclude their prior
convictions if their probative value were outweighed by their prejudicial
effect, but plaintiffs could not. The Court concluded that Rule 609(a)(1)
cannot constitutionally have this effect. 9
How should Rule 609(a)(1) have been read? The Court engaged in a
lengthy examination of Rule 609(a)'s legislative history, including the
common-law rule that such impeaching evidence is routinely admissible,
and its widespread criticism; the proposed Advisory Committee Rule,
8. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
9. Id. at 511.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VALUES

which simply followed the common-law approach in its first draft, renounced it in the second draft, and finally re-embraced the common-law
approach in its third and final draft; hearings, committee reports, and
floor debate from the House of Representatives which rejected the Advisory Committee's approach and voted for restricted admissibility in both
civil and criminal cases; the Senate committee report and floor debate,
which led to the Senate's voting for the Advisory Committee's final approach; and the conference committee report, which reached an ambiguous compromise.' 0 Based upon this legislative history, the Court found
that Congress "intended that only the accused in a criminal case should
be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule
609(a)(1)."
Based upon the same legislative history, three dissenting
Justices found that Congress intended that any party in a civil case can
rely on the balancing approach of Rule 609(a)(1), and that Green's convictions were inadmissible. Justice Antonin Scalia agreed with the
Court's result but refused to credit the legislative history arguments.
Bock Laundry suggests that the historical debate over the value of
legislative history is of practical importance today. The Supreme Court
(and by implication other federal courts) will consiaer legislative history
as valuable evidence of legislative intent. But that generalization is complicated by the three different values legislative history has for the Justices, the different kinds of legislative intent that such history might
illuminate, and the criticisms that have developed for each value and
each type of legislative intent.
I.

AUTHORITY VALUE:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS EVIDENCE OF

SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE INTENT

The Bock Laundry majority consciously invoked the authority value
of legislative history as evidence of specific legislative intent. The Court
conceded that Green's position indeed may be the better rule.' 2 Nonetheless, the Court felt its role in the case was "not to fashion the rule we
deem desirable but to identify the rule that Congress fashioned."' 3 To
ascertain the rule "that Congress fashioned," the Court examined the
legislative history for its authority value, as evidence of specific legislative
intent about the meaning of Rule 609(a)(1).
Legislative history as evidence of specific intent is, historically, the
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

511-24.
524.
508 & n.4.
508.
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main justification for examining such materials. The Court examines legislative history because it contains authoritative statements of what the
sovereign legislature commands. That is, the legislature enacts statutes
that we must obey. But statutory language is often unclear, and even
when it is technically clear it may be a drafting mistake, as Rule
609(a)(1) apparently was. To make sure they are reading the legislative
commands correctly, courts will consult the legislative history as the authoritative background context of the statute. The intellectual assumptions underlying this authority value of legislative history are the
following: (1) law is the command of the sovereign (the positivism assumption); (2) the sovereign in our representative democracy is the legislature (or people, and derivatively is the majority-elected legislature), and
courts are only the agents of the legislature (the legislative sovereignty
assumption); and (3) courts best fulfill their agency responsibilities by
discerning the subjective desires of the sovereign, what the members of
the legislature actually intended in specific instances (the subjectivism
assumption).
This intellectual tradition and its assumptions are linked to the development of Mechanical Jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth century. 14 In the middle of the nineteenth century, American judges and
commentators accepted the positivism and legislative sovereignty assumptions. They considered the inquiry in statutory interpretation to be
to determine what the legislature commands, and indeed they spoke of
implementing legislative intent.15 But for the most part they found legislative intent to be an objective construct, namely, the command manifested in the statute itself, related statutes, subsequent elaboration by the
legislature and the courts, and even customary usage.' 6 Thus, they did
not accept the subjectivism assumption, and did not consider evidence of
what legislators specifically expected a statute to mean in a particular
case.
The late nineteenth century saw the rise of more subjectivist approaches to law in several areas. Courts adopted the mens rea requirement in criminal law, the subjective malice test for punitive damages, and
the meeting of the minds metaphor in contract law during this period. A
similar movement occurred in statutory interpretation, and indeed the
14. See generally Cox, Ruminations on Statutory Interpretationin the Burger Court, 19 VAL.
U.L. REV. 287 (1985).
15. E.g., T. SEDGWICK, supra note 1, at 231 ("the object and the only object of judicial investigation, in regard to the construction of doubtful provisions of statute law, is to ascertain the intention
of the legislature which framed the statute" (emphasis in original)).
16. Id. at 243-59; see F. DWARRIS, supra note 1, at 143-45.
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turning point can be located in the 1890s. The first edition of the celebrated Sutherland treatise in 1891 reported that the intent of the law is
"the vital part, the essence of the law," 17 but followed earlier treatises
and the English approach in declining to look at extrinsic facts (legislative history) to establish such intent. 18 In 1892, the Supreme Court in
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 19 relied on a committee report to rewrite an immigration statute. The case was a sensation among
the commentators, not just because it was a Supreme Court decision, but
presumably because it fit the era's changing notions of intent. The second edition of the Sutherland treatise, published in 1904, reflected this
change by announcing that "proceedings of the legislature in reference to
the passage of an act may be taken into consideration in construing the
act."' 20 Although it waffled from case to case, the Supreme Court gradually came to rely on legislative history-mainly committee reports-to
confirm the original intentions of the legislators who passed statutes. 2'
Therefore, the Court in Bock Laundry was following a one-hundredyear-old tradition when it turned to the legislative history to ascertain
how the legislature specifically intended Rule 609(a)(1) to be applied.
Yet, from the early years of this century, the authority value of legislative
history has been subject to biting intellectual attack. Indeed, that
counter-tradition is also well-represented in Bock Laundry. Concurring
in the judgment, Justice Scalia belittled the Court's use of legislative history and argued that such materials have no authority value. 22 Dissent17. J. SUTHERLAND (1st ed.), supra note 1, at 309.

18. "The court will not hear proof of extrinsic facts known to the legislature or members
thereof which are supposed to indicate their intention in passing a law." Id. at 380; see id. at 383-84
(following English approach of looking at reports of blue-ribbon commissions proposing legislation
and journals, but not at "declarations of members of legislative bodies").
19. 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (reinterpreting statutory language to avoid absurd result, and relying
heavily on committee report).
20. J. SUTHERLAND (2nd ed.), supra note 2, at 879; see id. at 880-83 (citing Holy Trinity
Church to support reference to committee reports and petitions, and citing United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1896), for the view that legislative debates were still
inadmissible).
21. For early cases, see Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474-77 (1921)
(statement of House floor manager "uttered under such circumstances and with such impressive
emphasis that it is not going too far to say that except for this exposition. .. [the Clayton Act] would
not have been enacted in the form in which it was reported"); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (legislative debates, though only to suggest general purpose of statute);
Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495 (1904) (committee report and explanatory statement by
committee member). Consider also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917), where the
Court noted that "[r]eports to Congress accompanying the introduction of proposed laws may aid
the courts in reaching the true meaning of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation," but
refused to bend what it thought was a clear text in light of general legislative history.
22. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
an early version of his "New Textualism," see A. Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History,
presented at various law schools (1985-86) [hereinafter SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH].

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 66:365

ing Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun
argued that legislative materials are more useful for their purpose value
23
and therefore should not have been read so literally.
The debate over the authority value of the legislative materials in
Bock Laundry is rooted in history. The Legal Realists and subsequent
critics have set forth three different critiques against the use of legislative
history as evidence of specific intent. First, the constitutional critique
argues that the use of legislative history as evidence of the legislature's
specific intent is inconsistent with our Constitution's text and its traditions. Second, the political theory critique argues that legislative history
is not reliable evidence of specific legislative intent and, as a result, cannot be considered authoritative under the assumptions of its accompanying theory. Third, the jurisprudential critique questions authority value's
three assumptions and argues that statutory interpretation involves
something more than discerning and implementing the legislature's
commands.
A.

The ConstitutionalCritique

The constitutional critique argues that the specific intention of the
legislature has no authority value, because only the words of the statute
have authority value. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it, "We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means." '24 Holmes' point is that there must be an objectivity to law, lest
it violate the underlying constitutional norm that our government is a
"government of laws, and not men."' 25
The Legal Realists, notably Max Radin, debunked legislative history's authority value and argued that its use to discern specific legislative intent violates the constitutional separation of powers. 26 Under the
Constitution's allocation of power in Articles I-III, Radin argued, the
function of the legislature (Article I) "is not to impose [its] will even
within limits on [its] fellow-citizens, but to 'pass statutes,' which is a
fairly precise operation," involving the promulgation of words with oper23. Green, 490 U.S. at 533-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899), reprinted
in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).

Virtually every leading statement of the constitutional

critique quotes this Holmesianism. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 61 (1988) [hereinafter Original Intent]; SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra
note 22, at 17.
25. See SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra note 22, at 15-16.

26. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930).
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ative effects. "And once the words are out, recorded, engrossed, registered, proclaimed, inscribed in bronze, they in turn become
instrumentalities which administrators and courts use in performing
their own specialized functions. ' 27 In short, an approach to statutory
interpretation which views the legislature as having predetermined the
interpretation of its statute in certain cases confuses the specialized functions of the legislature (writing statutes) and the courts (interpreting statutes in concrete cases).
Subsequent constitutional critics, notably Judge Frank Easterbrook,
have emphasized that the use of legislative history as evidence of specific
intent is in tension with the Constitution's procedures for passing statutes. 28 Any intentions that members of Congress might have at any
point in time do not have the force of law unless they have been embodied in a bill that has been adopted in the same form by both Houses of
Congress (the bicameralism requirement) and signed by the President, or
not vetoed by the President within ten days while Congress is in session,
or passed by a super-majority over a presidential veto (the presentment
requirement). 29 "It would demean the constitutionally prescribed
method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on, amending, and approving a text is just a way to create some
evidence about the law, while'the real source of legal rules is the mental
' 30
processes of legislators."
Justice Scalia's Bock Laundry concurrence is written against the
background of these three types of constitutional problems with the
Court's using legislative history as evidence of specific legislative intent:
legislative history has no authority value, because that might violate the
Constitution's foundational assumption that we have a government of
laws, and not of "men"; separation of powers, in which the legislature
does not control the interpretation of laws; and Article I structures of
lawmaking. For Justice Scalia, these constitutional precepts instead suggest the following approach:
27. Id. at 871.
28. In re SinWlair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989); Easterbrook, supra note 24. Others who have
raised this argument include Justice Robert Jackson (see Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 395-96
(Jackson, J., concurring)) and Justice Scalia (see Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra note 22). See also OFFICE
OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: USING AND
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 26-33, 47-50 (Jan. 5, 1989) [hereinafter DEP'T OF JUSTICE LEGIS-

LATIVE HISTORY REPORT], which is largely derivative of the Easterbrook-Scalia criticisms.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
30. In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1344; see Thompson, 484 U.S. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between congressmen, are frail substitutes
for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President." (citations omitted)).
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[T]he meaning of terms on the statute-books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on
the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and
ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the
whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated-a
compatibility31which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always
has in mind.
This constitutional critique is a powerful one.32 But the critique has
not gone unanswered, and in fact the 1930 article by Radin was answered
in the same issue of the HarvardLaw Review by Professor (later Dean)
James Landis. 33 Landis and subsequent defenders of legislative history
as evidence of specific intent have (in my opinion) effectively responded
to the constitutional critique. They respond that: (1) legislative history
does not carry with it the authority of law, but is the most valuable contextual evidence of what the law requires; (2) authorial intent is a more
objective, more reliable source of statutory meaning than textual analysis
standing alone; and (3) a strict textualist approach which ignores legislative history tends to be incoherent in both theory and practice.
1.

Legislative History as Context

The first response is one of confession and avoidance: no one claims
that legislative history has the same authority value as the statutory text,
and no one denies that interpreting texts demands contextual evidence.
The question is whether legislative history is appropriate contextual evia4
dence, and defenders argue that it is.
Hence, defenders of legislative
history as contextual evidence do not argue that the committee report is
the law, but only that the committee report is an authoritative context
31. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia, J., concurring). He continued: "I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed by the Court, or all
of it combined, to lead me to a result different from the one that these factors suggest."
32. This is not to suggest that textualists would simply outlaw all use of legislative history
(though some may take that position in the future). Under their approach, legislative history might
be useful, as it was to Justice Scalia in Bock Laundry, to confirm that an apparent "absurd" statutory
meaning was never assumed or proposed by anyone. 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring). Such
history also might be useful when the statute is genuinely ambiguous, but only as contextual evidence of what the statute might mean, not as truly authoritative evidence of what Congress intended.
33. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).
34. Indeed, the old nineteenth century treatises introduced "extrinsic evidence" (legislative history) as simply more context for statutory interpretation, in addition to ordinary rules of grammar
and word usage, the whole act, statutes in pari materia, and the statute's common-law background.
Compare J. SUTHERLAND (lst ed.), supra note 1,at 309-434 (traditional sources, excluding legislative history) with J. SUTHERLAND (2d ed.), supra note 2, at 879-83 (same, but including legislative
history).
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for choosing among alternative meanings of the text. Viewed in this way,
legislative history supports rather than undermines the objectivity of law.
If legislative history is simply evidence contributing to the Court's
understanding of a statute, it is hardly legislative usurpation of judicial
duties. Indeed, its connection to the legislative process that produced the
statute renders it truly useful to the interpreter. Rule 609(a)(1) is a puzzling statute, and a great deal of legislative discussion focused on that
Rule. Just as a court might attend to evidence of the grantor's original
expectations when interpreting a trust or to the principal's original expectations when interpreting directives to an agent, so too a court might
find legislative expectations relevant to interpreting a statute written by
35
the legislature.
The most troubling constitutional objection to the legislative history's authority value is the Article I problem. Nonetheless, so long as
legislative history is simply viewed as context, it does not violate the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I as they have been
interpreted by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha.36 Itself quoting a
Senate committee report, Chadha held that the bicameralism and presentment requirements are only formally applicable when "actions taken
by either House ...contain matter which is properly regarded as legislative in its character and effect," ' 37 namely, to alter legal rights and duties.
As a formal matter, committee reports consulted to explain the meaning
of the statute do not themselves seek to alter legal rights and duties, and
consulting them does not violate bicameralism or presentment any more
than would consulting a dictionary. Chadha further emphasized that
these were only limitations on Congress' actions (the requirements are in
Article I), and not on the branches of government regulated by Articles
II and 111.38 Bicameralism and presentment are not formally relevant as

a limitation on subsequent implementation
39
legislation.

and interpretation

of

35. See Johnson & Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamics Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74
IOWA L. REV. 545 (1989).
36. 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
37. Id. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)).
38. See id. at 953 n. 116 (explaining that executive implementation of statutes, even if changing
legal rights and duties is not covered by Article I).
39. The arguments against the New Textualism's constitutional attacks on legislative history
are explored more thoroughly in Eskridge, supra note 6, at 670-78.
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Authorial Intent as the Most Objective Evidence of Textual
Meaning

Defenders of legislative history also argue that if one wants an objectively determinable method for discerning textual meaning, consideration
of original intent (as revealed by the text and legislative history) is superior to consideration of the text alone. If all interpretation depends upon
shared context, as appears to be the case, then the issue becomes choosing the most reliable or objectively determinable shared context-that
which would have been most accessible to members of Congress voting
on the bill, the President signing it into law, and judges interpreting it
over time. Defenders of the use of legislative history may offer more
authoritative contextual evidence than the materials emphasized by textualist critics. 4° Textualists tend to rely on horizontal context, that is,
the current version of the statutory provision, the whole act, related statutes, and existing canons of construction. Defenders of legislative history
as evidence of specific intent tend to rely on vertical context, that is, the
origins of the statute, its progress through the legislative process, and its
subsequent elaboration. 41 Which type of context is more reliable?
Justice Scalia in Bock Laundry overstates the case for relying. only
on horizontal context. He argues against exploring the complicated
background of Rule 609(a)(1), because such "minute details" would not
have been accessible to members of Congress (or, presumably, the President).42 That claim is questionable. The materials upon which Justice
Stevens relied-Advisory Committee drafts, committee reports of both
chambers, and the conference report-were not considered minute details by the legislators who debated Rule 609. In fact, the interlocutors
revealed an impressive grasp of the issues raised by these materials, all of
which were available to the legislators when they voted on the bill and
3
the President when he signed the bill into law. 4
40. Note the very impressive body of modem interpretive theory arguing that authorial intent
is the only reliable method for interpreting literary texts. See E. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION (1976); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRIT. INQ. 723 (1982). Defenders of
legislative history as evidence of specific intent might claim that such arguments have special relevance in statutory interpretation.
41. The horizontal/vertical context distinction was developed in Eskridge, InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 116, 120, 122-24 (1988).
42. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. For example, during the critical debate in the Senate over Senator McClellan's amendment,
the interlocutors heavily relied on or referred to the Advisory Committee position, the position
adopted by the House, and the position of the Senate committee. See 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (1974)
(Sen. McClellan); id. at 37,077-78 (Sen. Hart); id. at 37,079 (Sen. Burdick); id. at 37,080 (Sen. Kennedy). Seventy Senators voted on the McClellan amendment's first consideration (which failed on a
tie vote), and 73 voted on its reconsideration. If these Senators had considered anything, they would
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Contrast the evidence Justice Scalia announced in Bock Laundry
that he would consider-the text of the statute, the whole statute, and
related provisions, including those enacted subsequently. Is it not even
less likely that members of Congress voting on the bill, or the President
signing it, would be aware of other statutory provisions, especially ones
not yet enacted? Justice Scalia admits that this is a "fiction," albeit a
"benign" one, but is it not at least as justifiable a fiction to assume that
members of Congress can read committee reports to educate themselves
about a proposed bill? There is substantial evidence from political science that members are more likely to read the committee report than the
bill itself.44
Textualist critics also tend to overstate the ease with which language
conventions can yield plain meaning in statutory texts over a period of
time. One of the critics' favorite cases is Caminetti v. United States.4 5 A
federal statute made it a crime knowingly to transport any girl or woman
in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or
"for any other immoral purpose."' 46 The Supreme Court held that the
"ordinary and usual sense" of the statute criminalized two defendants'
for transporting their mistresses across state lines. The Court rejected
the relevance of the legislative history upon which the dissenting Justices
relied. The House report, for example, indicated that the statute was
aimed "solely to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling
thousands of women and girls against their will and desire to enter and
continue in a line of prostitution. '4 7 Caminetti hardly strikes me as following any kind of objectively determinable meaning. Indeed, it seems
arbitrary. There is nothing in the phrase "immoral purposes" that
targets transporting one's lover, and several canons of construction counsel against an expansive reading of the residual phrase. 48 The Court's
have considered the documents Justice Stevens emphasized in Bock Laundry. These same documents, plus the conference report, were critical in the final debate on the bill. See id. at 40,890-96.
44. See, e.g., W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 94, 92d
ed. (1984); E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973).
45. 242 U.S. 470 (1917), cited approvingly for the textualist position in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1224 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342, 1344
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.). However, DEP'T OF JUSTICE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REPORT,
supra note 28, at 62-63, admits that Caminetti is excessively literalistic.
46. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970)), amended
by Pub. L. 99-628, 5(b)(l), Nov. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 3511 (Supp. 1991) (textual quotes omitted in
amended statute).
47. H.R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, quoted in Caminetti,242 U.S. at 498 (McKenna,
J., dissenting).
48. Namely, ejusdem generis (the rule that an item in a list will usually be taken as being of the
same genre or class as the other items), noscitur a sociis (the rule that a thing shall be known by its
associates), and the rule of lenity, all discussed in W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 639-41, 658-76 (1988).
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interpretation seems to be scarcely anything more than its own value
judgment that having a mistress is immoral. If there were an objectively
determinable meaning of the phrase "for any other immoral purpose," it
would be that suggested by the legislative history, not that suggested by
the Court's quaint view of the statutory text.
3. The Quandry of Absurd Results
A final difficulty with the constitutional critique is the problem of
absurd results. That is, there are a fair number of cases where the statute
plainly commands a silly result. If legislative history has some authority
value, it can demonstrate that Congress never intended the absurd result,
and hence relieve the Court of having to reach such a result. On the
other hand, if the constitutional critique is right and clear texts must be
enforced as written, there seems little choice but to interpret the statute
in a bizarre way. Yet even the most ardent textualists admit an exception
for absurd results. That is inconsistent with their theory. In order to
bend statutes to avoid absurd results, one either has to accept the subjectivism assumption or reject the positivism or legislative sovereignty assumptions. Either course of action is perilous for the textualist critic of
legislative history's authority value.
On the one hand, if the textualist critic accepts the subjectivism assumption for absurd result cases, it is hard to reject that assumption for
cases where the result is unreasonable or where there was probably a
drafting error. Yet such a move is tantamount to abandoning the textualist position, since there are a great many cases where the apparent textual meaning is unreasonable. On the other hand, if the textualist critic
instead abandons the legislative sovereignty or positivism assumptions
for absurd result cases (this is too unreasonable for the Court to let Congress get away with), that critic not only has a hard time distinguishing
absurd result from unreasonable result cases, but has abandoned the entire theory. The legislature is not supreme unless it is always supreme,
and law is not the command of the sovereign unless it is always so.
Thus, Rule 609(a)(1), at issue in Bock Laundry, literally discriminates between civil plaintiffs and civil defendants. It permits introducing
serious criminal convictions not involving dishonesty only if "the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant." The plaintiff's (or plaintiff's witness') criminal convictions, of course, will almost always pass this test
and hence be admitted, while the defendant's (or defendant's witness')
convictions often will not. This is a relatively clear legislative command,
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yet even arch-textualist Justice Scalia admitted that the statute could not
be enforced literally, though he cannot explain why. The rule is pretty
clear and would be easy to administer. Its discrimination against civil
plaintiffs might well be unconstitutional, but in that event Rule
609(a)(1)'s discrimination against civil plaintiffs should have been invalidated and Green's convictions excluded from evidence based upon the
balancing inquiry. 49 That result strikes me as just, yet Justice Scalia
agreed to rewrite the statute, apparently in order to effectuate legislative
intent. 50
And, then, I think Justice Scalia was tripped up by an arbitrary approach to the statutory text. He claimed he was rewriting the statute in a
way that "does least violence to the text." 5 1 To justify that claim, Justice
Scalia claimed that he was rewriting the text to cover "prejudicial effect
to the criminal defendant" (adding the new italicized word), whereas the
dissent would rewrite the text to cover "prejudicial effect to the civil
plaintiff,civil defendant, government in a criminalcase, and criminal defendant" (adding several new italicized words). Of course, the dissent's
approach looks like a violent rewriting of the text-until one realizes that
the dissent would actually rewrite the text to say "prejudicial effect to a
party" (replacing defendant with party). A fair presentation makes it
unclear whether the dissenters rewrote the text any more than Justice
Scalia.
B.

The Political Theory Critique

The political theory critique argues that even if statutory interpretation were a search for specific legislative intent, legislative history is not
reliable evidence of such intent. The Legal Realists, especially Radin,
suggested this critique, 52 and subsequent developments in political theory
(especially public choice theory) have lent support to the Realists' critique. 53 Defenders of legislative history's authority value have responded
49. Note here that the canon of avoiding constitutional issues, see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979), is not applicable when the statute is clear. Eg., United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985).
50. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("entirely
appropriate" to look at legislative history "to verify that what seems to us an unthinkable disposition
(civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing prejudice) was indeed unthought-of").
51.

Id.

52. The classic explication of this critique is Radin, supra note 26. See also R. DWORKIN, How
to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985); Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory
of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985). The equally classic response is Landis, supra note
33. See also R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 67-78 (1975);
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).

53. Modem public choice theory, the application of game theory and economic concepts to
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to these arguments, but over time the political theory arguments have
grown more powerful and the defenders' position has given away much
of legislative history's claim to authority. In my view, the political theory critique has been more successful than the constitutional critique.
1. Strong Intentionalism-Actual Intent
If we were to value legislative intent for its authority value, the most
obvious meaning of legislative intent would be the actual intent a majority of legislators in each chamber had in mind when they passed the statute. Such actual intent is the paradigm that Radin set up for his classic
critique in 1930. In it, he raised three problems with what I call "strong
54
intentionalism."
First is the problem of indeterminacy. When most members of Congress vote on a bill, it is doubtful that they have a specific intent on more
than a few salient issues. 5 Even if members did have specific intentions
about certain issues, those intentions often change in the process of getting the bill through Congress. And even if members have unchanging
specific intentions about an issue, those intentions are often unknowable
from the historical record, which reveals the preferences of few members.
Second is the problem of aggregating intent. Radin argued that it is
very hard to say that a collective body has a meaningful "intent" on any
given issue beyond its objectively manifested words and deeds. 5 6 This is

especially difficult for legislation, because one must aggregate the preferences not only of large groups of people, but of two different collections
of people (the House and Senate). Furthermore, the aggregation of the
preferences of those two groups also has to match the intent of the President who signs the bill. If these problems were not enough, modem theories of "majority cycling" suggest that in many instances there are
several different outcomes within any voting process that follow simple,
pairwise majority voting schemes. 57 That a majority in a legislative body
politics, has enriched the array of arguments available to the realist critique. The classic explications
are D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-67, 88-

115 (1991); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). See also Eskridge,
Politics Without Romance: Implicationsof Public Choice Theoryfor Statutory Interpretation,74 VA.
L. REV. 289 (1988); SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra note 22.
54. See Radin, supra note 26, at 870-71.
55. Many members will have a specific intent on no issue, because all they intend to do when
they vote for a bill is to see it become law. Members may vote for legislation simply because their
President, their party, or their interest group supporters favor the bill.
56. Radin, supra note 26, at 870-71.
57. The classics are K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963), and
D. BLACK, THE THEORIES OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958). For application of these theories to statutory interpretation, see Shepsle, Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, - J. INT'L L. & ECON.
- (1992) (forthcoming). See also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 53; Easterbrook, supra note 53.
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voted for a certain provision is not conclusive evidence that they prefer
that provision over all competing ones.
Third is the problem of strategic behavior. Members' statements of
their preferences may not be perfectly reliable. Statements of individual
legislators during hearings and floor debate on proposed legislation are
especially unreliable, because they are often nothing more than strategic
posturing. Indeed, they are often just inserts written up entirely after
the fact. 58 Even committee reports, long considered the most reliable
legislative history, have been attacked as unreliable on the grounds that
they are written by staff, and are not necessarily even read by legislators
on the committee. They may even contain strategic insertions designed
to produce a judicial interpretation that did not have enough votes to be
59
written into the statutory text.
All of Radin's problems are on display in BockLaundry. Consider
the fate of Rule 609(a)(1) in the Senate. The Judiciary Committee proposed to exclude impeachment by prior felonies not involving falsehoods
when a criminal defendant is testifying, or when any other kind of witness is testifying and the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighs its
probative value. 60 Senator McClellan proposed an amendment making
all such felony convictions admissible.6" The vote on Senator McClellan's amendment was 35 to 35, and the amendment failed. 62 On reconsideration, his amendment was adopted, 38 to 34.63 In conference, the
Senate agreed to a compromise proposal, which became the current version of Rule 609(a)(1).
What the Senate intended is indeterminate. The preference of many
Senators is quite unclear. Senator Stevens, for example, voted against the
McClellan amendment, then voted to reconsider, then voted for the
amendment, and (at the end) voted for the final bill. It is completely
unclear what his intent ever was on the Rule 609(a)(1) issue, and if he
harbored any intent it apparently changed, given his different votes.
Even if one might determine the preference of individual Senators, it is
very hard to aggregate their preferences on this issue. Although the Senate adopted the McClellan amendment, it is far from clear that the
58. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 155-56.
59. See SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra note 22.
60. S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
61. 120 CONG. REC. 37,075-76 (1974).
62. Id. at 37,080.
63. Id. at 37,083. The different numbers are the result of the following: two Senators (Gurney
and Stennis) who had been absent on the first vote voted for the McClellan amendment on reconsideration; two Senators (Stevens and McIntyre) who had voted against the McClellan amendment on
the first vote voted for it on reconsideration; one Senator (Moss) who had voted for the McClellan
amendment on the first vote voted against it on reconsideration.
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amendment reflected the preferences of the Senate. After all, it was originally defeated on a tie vote. It was later adopted, mainly because Senators Stevens and McIntyre changed their votes from "against" to "for"
the amendment. We do not know why they changed their votes, or why
certain senators did not vote. They could have been acting strategically
and not sincerely, perhaps pursuant to a secret logroll for all we know.
Finally, it seems quite probable that the McClellan amendment
would have failed if it had been paired up against a more moderate committee proposal, and that would have significantly affected the statutory
result. 64 The indeterminacy of strong intentionalism for settling the Bock
Laundry issue is especially significant, for this was not a counterfactual
issue (as is usually the case)--it was an issue about which Congress specifically debated and voted.
2.

Weak Intentionalism-Conventional Intent

To a certain extent, Radin was attacking a strawman by his focus on
actual intent. Landis responded that Radin's critique "disregard[s] the
realities of the legislative procedure." To wit: "[T]hrough the committee
report, the explanation of the committee chairman, and otherwise, a
mere expression of assent [when other members vote for a bill] becomes
in reality a concurrence in the expressed views of another."'6 5 Also, at
various points in the legislative process-in committee, on the floor, in
conference--choices are made, and certain approaches are rejected.
That, too, is good evidence of "a real and not a fictitious intent and
'66
should be deemed to govern questions of construction.
What Landis and other defenders are doing is to create a set of
"conventions" that can be presumed to reflect a collective intent, if any
such intent indeed exists. These conventions, they would argue, are
based upon a solid foundation in legislative procedure: legislators have
delegated the detail and creative work on legislation to committees and
sponsors. Therefore, if the bill passes unamended, their statements about
the legislation can be taken as having been accepted by the majority.
64. For example, if the Senate Judiciary Committee had proposed a balancing test for convictions used to impeach criminal defendants and otherwise admitted convictions (the rule created in
Bock Laundry), I think it likely that the McClellan amendment would have failed. In that event, the
Senate/House compromise would probably have been more liberal, given the substantially more
liberal position of the House version. In short, a slightly different Senate agenda could very well
have yielded a very different legislative compromise.
65. Landis, supra note 33, at 888-89 (citations omitted); see a more recent version of this position in R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 71-82 (responding to Radin's arguments).
66. Landis, supra note 33, at 890; see Jones, Extrinsic Aids, supra note 3, at 742 (legislative
intent is not the actual "will" of Congress, but only a "fiction" representing the general understanding of legislators when a statute was enacted).
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When the delegated subgroups or one of the chambers itself rejects proposed language, that probably means that the thrust of the rejected language is not part of the legislation. The members' votes on the bill or the
rejected proposal are an implicit assent to this conventional wisdom.
Hence, defenders do not have to argue vote-counting issues to invoke
legislative history as evidence of specific intent. Bock Laundry itself
made no pretense of counting votes and instead relied on the related convention that any big change in the status quo will probably be noted quite
explicitly, even dramatically, in the legislative process. 67 Since neither
the conference report nor subsequent floor debate suggested that the
compromise version of Rule 609(a)(1) was a major departure from the
common-law rule, the Court presumed that this was probably the compromise that must have been struck in conference.
Although the Realists did not have theories of the legislative process
to respond to this account in the 1930s,68 modem legislative process theory suggests some reason to doubt that these conventions really are adequate surrogates for actual intent. Indeed, there is reason to believe that
these conventions are distorting much of the time. Consider committee
reports and sponsor statements, generally considered the most authoritative legislative history, based upon the convention of legislative delegation. 69 To begin with, these players may not be representative of
Congress as a whole. Surely this is obvious for sponsors or managers of
bills, and political science studies suggest the same may be true for committees. Members seek committees which are related to the interests of
their constituents, and are successful in obtaining the assignments that
they desire. This process of self-selection skews the overall preferences of
many, and perhaps most, committees toward narrow interests. 70 For a
notorious example, members from farm districts often desire placement
67. "A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing
that the legislature intended such a change." 490 U.S. at 521.
68. For example, Radin's later response to Landis was simply to confess that his own statements were "undoubtedly somewhat too sweeping .... I intended then-and I certainly should like
to take the position now-that [legislative materials] are neither irrelevant nor incompetent, but that
they are in no sense controlling." Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 410-11
(1942).
69. "But in the absence of evidence either way as to the construction placed upon a statute by
the Congressional membership generally, the courts should recognize the degree to which committee
specialization has become characteristic of the legislative process and should give weight to a discovered committee understanding, even though the particular point of statutory meaning was never
reported, formally, to the Congress as a whole." Jones, Extrinsic Aids, supra note 3, at 748-49.
70. See R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITrEES 1-21, 43-45, 69 (1973); K. SHEPSLE, THE
GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978); see generally Eulau, Committee Selection, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 191, 208-15 (G. Loewenberg, S. Patterson & M. Jewell eds. 1985) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK] (analyzing the empirical studies and models of committee selection). But see K.
KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION ch. 4 (1991).
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on the Agriculture Committee (urban members tend not to desire it), and
a casual examination suggests that farm district members overwhelmingly dominate those committees in Congress. 7 ' Even if the membership
of committees better reflected membership in Congress, over time there
would be a skewing of preference through the formation of triangular
relationships among subcommittees, agencies and departments, and rele72
vant interest groups.
Given interests and preferences that might diverge from those of
their chambers, sponsors and committees have incentives to behave strategically. Strategic behavior might show up in committee reports and
sponsors' floor statements, which makes even these accepted conventions
potentially quite unreliable sources. For example, on the Bock Laundry
issue it appears that the House and Senate Judiciary Committees were
more liberal than their respective chambers (especially the Senate). Yet
the committee members controlled the writing of the conference report
and dominated discussion during floor consideration of the conference
bill. Some of their statements are clearly self-serving, 73 and others may
also have been. To the extent that committee reports and sponsors' statements are used by courts to elaborate on the statutory language, there is
a danger that they systematically distort Congress' overall preferences,
given the skewing effects of the established conventions.
3.

Attenuated Intentionalism-Imaginative Reconstruction

The political theory critique that both strong and weak intentionalism rest upon questionable assumptions about the legislative process has
gained force over time. This difficulty has impelled the most thoughtful
proponents of legislative history as evidence of specific intent to develop
an even more generalized version of that theory, namely, "imaginative
reconstruction." As articulated by Professor (later Dean) Roscoe
Pound, the judge tries to discover "what the law-maker meant by assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and endeavoring
to gather from the mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he
sought to meet them, his intention with respect to the particular point in
71.

See M. BARONE & G. UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS.1411, 1423

(1990), for a listing.
72. See generally R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC
POLICY (4th ed. 1987); Hamm, Legislative Committees Executive Agencies, and Interest Groups, in
HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 70, at 573.
73. Eg., 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974) (Rep. Hungate's statement that the "conference rule
strikes a middle ground between the two versions, but a ground as close or closer to the House
version than to the Senate's").
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controversy."' 74 Judge Learned Hand was the classic practitioner of this

approach, 75 and Judge Richard Posner has recently revived interest in
imaginative reconstruction as a general theory of statutory
76
interpretation.
Imaginative reconstruction best captures the Supreme Court's use of
legislative history in Bock Laundry.77 The Court told a highly contextualized story about Rule 609(a)(1), and a point that emerged from the
story was that there was no legislative agreement to expand much upon
the common-law rule, which generally admitted criminal convictions for
impeachment. 78 Given Congress' disinclination to change the common
law drastically, the Court was reluctant to expand upon Rule 609(a)(1)'s
limitation of its benefit to defendants and, therefore, narrowed the benefit
to criminal defendants instead of expanding it to all parties.
Imaginative reconstruction is the most successful theory of legislative history as evidence of specific intent. It generally avoids the constitutional critique by refusing to treat any specific tidbit from the
legislative record as completely authoritative in the same way that statutory language is. It avoids at least part of the political theory critique by
refusing to claim that its reconstruction is anything more than a wellinformed probabilistic judgment about how the average legislative observer would have thought the statute resolved an issue when the statute
was enacted. Hence, imaginative reconstruction does not have to engage
in vote-counting and aggregation efforts, nor does it have to defend the
validity of legislative history conventions. The interpreter acts like a
good historian, examining the evidence and reaching the best conclusion
she can, discarding conventions that appear unrealistic in the general, or
unreliable in the specific case.
Notwithstanding its sensibleness, imaginative reconstruction suffers
74. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
75. See, e.g., Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 788-91 (2d Cir.
1946), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir.
1914); L. HAND, How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 103, 105-10 (3d ed. 1960).
76. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985) [hereinafter FED-

ERAL COURTS] ("the judge should try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and
figure out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him").
77. Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion, quite self-consciously follows the imaginative
reconstruction technique in his statutory opinions generally. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987) (Stevens, J.).
78. Evidence in support of this point included: the Advisory Committee's own flip-flopping on
the issue; the controversy engendered in the House and the Senate; the confining language of the
final bill and the conference report; the explicit statements of Representative Dennis, a conferee who
modified his earlier expansive view in light of the conference "compromise"; and the presumption
against legislative alteration of common-law rules.
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from an important difficulty. In its effort to avoid the constitutional and
political theory critiques which beset other theories, imaginative reconstruction compromises the critical assumptions of those other specific intent theories by elevating the judicial interpreter well above the supposed
role of the honest agent faithfully implementing the intended commands
of the supreme legislature. This illustrates a central dilemma for any
theory of legislative history as evidence of specific intent. The most attractive version in a representative democracy (strong intentionalism) is
subject to crippling objections that it makes politically unrealistic assumptions and leaps of logic. To meet these objections, weaker theories
have been put forward, but these theories have gradually sacrificed the
essence of legislative history's authority value-the intuitive appeal of an
interpretation that was specifically intended by our elected representatives. The more attenuated the claim made by the theory, the less authoritative becomes the use of legislative history, and the greater the role
of judicial discretion becomes. Under the theory of imaginative reconstruction, the role of the judge threatens to overwhelm the role of legislative history.
Thus, any assumption that judges will be able faithfully to recreate
the historical understanding of a previous legislature is subject to some
doubt. Gaps in the historical record, the judge's imperfect ability to understand the record, and the distance created by time are all factors that
impede even the most imaginative reconstruction. A central lesson of
Legal Realism, explored more thoroughly below, is that judicial discretion is not easily cabined, and the judge's own context and values will
decisively influence how she reconstructs the past.
Indeed, it is precisely this imposition of judicial values that occurred
in Bock Laundry. Elaborating on the final version of Rule 609(a)(1), the
conference report (obviously the critical document for any kind of imaginative reconstruction) spoke generally of protecting defendants in criminal cases. But the Court candidly admitted that this evidence was hardly
conclusive. Why did the report not concede that the conference committee was refusing to protect civil litigants? Its failure even to mention
them can be read as evidence either that Congress probably meant for the
balancing test only to protect criminal defendants, or that Congress was
just not thinking very specifically, or that the conference committee
could not agree on a rule for civil cases and so left the issue to be resolved
in the courts. 79 I think the second explanation is the most historically
plausible, if you carefully follow the flow of the actual legislative de79. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521-22.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VALUES

1990]

bates80 and if you recall the position of each chamber coming into conference.8 Nonetheless, the Court chose the first explanation, apparently
because "[a] party contending that legislative action changed settled law
'82
has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change."
Thus, a judicial clear statement rule-and not the legislative historywas ultimately critical to the Court's "reconstruction" of the probable
"intent" of Congress.
Bock Laundry interpreted a recently enacted statute, and the interpretive issue was the subject of substantial deliberation. Consider how
much more difficult, indeterminate, and subject to judicial interpolation
it would be for a court to interpret an older statute for an issue not specifically discussed. 8 3 The Supreme Court's efforts to reconstruct the intent
of the Congresses enacting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, and even
1964 can be easily shown to be indeterminate, because the ultimate interpretive answer is driven more by current statutory context and the
Court's own values than by the values of the enacting Congress. 84 In
these cases and others, the Court's interpretations are more imaginative
than they are reconstructions.
C,

The JurisprudentialCritique

Underlying many of the arguments in the 1930s and 1940s against
legislative history as evidence of specific intent was a jurisprudential
questioning of the theory's assumptions (positivism, legislative sover80. The debate in the House considered effects of impeachment by felony convictions in both
criminal and civil settings. But the Representatives were clearly most interested in the criminal
setting, and one simply suggested that the civil application be dealt with separately. 120 CONG. REC.
2379 (1974) (Rep. Wiggins). The Senate report focused mainly, but not exclusively, on impeachment of "the accused" in criminal cases, SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 14-15, and virtually all
of the Senate debate focused on criminal cases. 120 CONG. REC. 3075-83 (1974). The conference
report completely ignores civil cases. The most likely inference I drew from this evidence is that the
conferees focused only on criminal cases and forgot to deal explicitly with civil cases. The Court's
inference that Congress intended to carry forth the common-law rule of unrestricted impeachment
finds very little support in the dynamics of the legislative debates.
81. The House bill permitted impeachment in all cases (civil and criminal) only if there were a
crimen falsi, and the Senate bill as amended permitted impeachment in all cases (civil and criminal)
if the witness had been convicted of a serious felony or a crimenfalsi. Thus neither chamber coming
into conference distinguished between civil and criminal cases in fashioning an impeachment rule for
prior felony convictions. The conference committee probably had the authority to create such a
bifurcated rule, but there is no positive evidence that it so intended.
82. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 521.
83. Judge Posner recognizes this problem and in his recent work has adopted a more eclectic
approach. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 220-85 (1990); Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline, 1962-87, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
84. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1484-94, 153840 (1987).
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eignty, and subjectivism). Turn-of-the-century Holmesian objectivism
questioned the desirability of tying law to subjective legislative intentions. The Legal Realists of the 1920s deconstructed the asserted link
between legislative expectations and judicial interpretation, and thereby
suggested the inherent inconsistency between legislative supremacy and
statutory interpretation by an independent judiciary. Legal rationalists
of the late 1930s and 1940s recoiled against the stark positivism shared
by Mechanical Jurisprudence and Legal Realism and urged a closer relationship between law and reason.
The effect of these jurisprudential developments was not only to undermine the intellectual foundations of the classic theory of legislative
history as evidence of specific intent, but also to prepare the way for fresh
theorizing about the value of legislative history.
1. Holmesian Objectivism
Justice Holmes resisted the emerging subjectivist theories of law and
sought to place law on a more objective footing. Just as he favored a
"reasonable person" standard for tort liability, so he favored a "normal
speaker" standard for statutory interpretation, so as to preserve the integrity, the "externality of the law." 8 5 Holmes thus accepted the positivism and legislative sovereignty assumptions undergirding legislative
history as evidence of specific intent, but resisted the subjectivism assumption. For Holmes, positive law loses much of its moral force unless
its commands can be determined objectively. Holmes' interest in the externality of law has been a primary linchpin in subsequent attacks on
legislative history as evidence of specific intent,8 6 but as I have suggested
above, law's objectivity can be usefully served by reference to legislative
history. And Holmes, who was nothing if not practical and eclectic,
sometimes relied on legislative history to figure out what the external law
required. 87 In short, Holmes' rejection of subjectivist concepts of law
85. Holmes, supra note 24, at 417-18: "[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in
[T]he normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary
which they were used .....
form, so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and a
reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of the law."
86. The Realist Radin and New Texualists Easterbrook and Scalia all pay homage to Holmesian objectivism, for example.
87. His opinion for the Court in Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41
(1928), for example, relied on legislative history to interpret a statute the dissenting Justices found
clear on its face. "It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to
[extrinsic] evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of
law," Holmes responded, "and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
Id. at 48.
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was only a jurisprudential start in the critique of legislative history as
evidence of specific intent.
2.

Realist Vision of Judicial Power

The Legal Realists agreed with Holmes' attack on subjectivism, but
added their own vigorous indictment of the legislative sovereignty assumption and its corollary, that judges interpreting statutes are simple
agents of the legislature with little or no lawmaking discretion. Thus,
Radin argued that the only job of Congress is to write words that are put
into the statute books. Once the statutes have been written its job is over,
88
and its expectations are irrelevant to statutory interpretation.
"Just as the application of legislation does not usually depend on the
discovery of the meaning of words, so does it [not] depend on discovery
of the 'intention' or the 'will' of the legislature, or of the legislator," argued Radin in 1946. "The basis for this is once more the theory of the
sovereign legislator who.., is the political superior of the administrator
or judge. Since our legislature is no more and no less sovereign than
administrators or judges, and since all constitutional officials have a prescribed function, the theory falls with the basis upon which it is
89
erected."
Radin's point was that the legislature in our constitutional system is
not sovereign. "We the People" are sovereign and have delegated governmental tasks to three branches of government, one of which is the
legislature. Hence, judges are not mere agents of the legislature, but are
instead on an equal plane. Both the legislature and the courts owe allegiance to the overall operation of our government. 90 The Realists further
asserted that judging is a creative process, 9' and most prominent Realists
88. Radin, supra note 26, at 871.
89. Radin, supra note 68, at 406. "If we persist in saying that the main and fundamental purpose is to carry out the will of a specific person, when we know that we are dealing with a person
who can have no will, as we understand it, and who has no more right to impose his unexpressed will
on the administrators and judges than the latter may impose their will as such on the legislature-if
we persist in saying this, we shall continue to be driven by a disingenuousness that irks a great many
lawyers and should be extremely unpleasant to all of them." Id. at 407.
90. Radin's point seems quite apparent today. The unitary positivism of Mechanical Jurisprudence was undergirded in large part by Austin's positivism, which in turn owed much to the unitariness of sovereignty through most of English history (the Crown was sovereign through the Middle
Ages, then the early modern period saw Parliament struggle to become the embodiment of sovereign
government). Our constitutional traditions are very different, and the Constitution itself contemplates three co-equal branches of government. The idea of equal branches united in their pursuit of
the common good has been revived in the last decade as part of the "republican revival." See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman, The
Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
91. The classic statement is Judge Cardozo's confession that the nature of the judicial process is
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vigorously asserted that statutory interpretation involved substantial judicial lawmaking. 9 2 Even if legislative intent were relevant, it could
never practically confine judicial discretion. "[A]fter all, it is only words
that the legislature utters; it is for the courts to say what those words
mean." Many early twentieth century thinkers argued that "all the Law
is judge-made law" and that "courts put life into the dead words of the
93
statute."
Although the Realists may have gone too far in emphasizing the
inevitability of judicial lawmaking, 94 their general insight that interpretation involves a creative interaction of text, context, and interpreter is
widely accepted today. 9 5 To the extent that the Realists were successful
in debunking the legislative sovereignty assumption, they established a
dilemma for themselves as well as for more traditional scholars. How
can the objectivity of positive law (the Holmes position, accepted by the
Realists) be maintained in the face of substantial and unfettered judicial
lawmaking (the result of Realist emphasis on judicial creativity)? In my
view, the Realists never quite escaped this paradox, but the next generation of legal scholars thought they had found a way out.
3. The Rationalist Revival
A final contribution of the Realists was their belief that law is policy, to be followed because it furthers the collective goals of our society.
"A statute is better described as an instruction to administrators and
courts to accomplish a definite result, usually the securing or maintaining
of recognized social, political, or economic values." Hence, Radin asserted, "we may call the statute a ground design," a general policy plan
"uncertainty" and not objective answers, and that "the process in its highest reaches is not discovery, but creation ....
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
92. See, e.g., M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 131 (1933); C. CURTIS, IT'S YOUR
LAW 65 (1954); K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 382 (1960);

Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414 (1961);
Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259,
1267, 1269-70 (1947).
93. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 124-25 (2d ed. 1921). "Whoever hath
an absolute authority to interpret any ... laws, it is he who is truly the Law-giver ... and not the
person who first wrote.., them." Id. at 172 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bishop Hoadly). Note
that John Chipman was not a Legal Realist, but this book contains many ideas with which the

Realists agreed.
94. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 13-21, 67-86, for the best synthesis of more traditional
scholars' responses to the Legal Realists.
95. See generally R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 14 & n.5, 18 & n.21 (leading source critical
of the super-Realist perspective, but still conceding this point). The new "jurisprudence of interpretation" in the 1980s suggests this point even more strongly than the Realists did. See generally
InterpretationSymposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Law and Literature:Symposium, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 373 (1982).
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whose details would be filled in by courts over time. 96 In the late 1930s
and 1940s, some thinkers-notably Professor Lon Fuller-went beyond
the Realists' emphasis on policy to urge a renewed interest in natural
law, the concept that law is accountable to reason and is not just the
commands of the sovereign. 97 The interest in natural law was stimulated
in part by the belief of most American intellectuals that our law was
more legitimate than the law promulgated by fascist governments in
Europe.9 8
Fuller argued in 1940 that law cannot be mere commands and predictions, because we cannot even restate or predict the law without being
influenced by our conceptions of the good. Just as the teller of an amusing anecdote will unconsciously alter (improve) the anecdote upon retelling it, so the interpreter of a statute will reinterpret it in light of the
statute's perceived goals in an effort to make the statute live up to its best
purpose.9 9 In combination with the Realists' view of judging as a creative process, Fuller's insight was quite powerful. Law, according to
Fuller, is not and should not be static. Any effort to tie legal meaning to
its origins betrays the legal process. 100 This insight rendered traditional
theories of legislative history obsolete, and stimulated a second period of
theorizing about the value that might be served by legislative history.
II.

PURPOSE VALUE:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS EVIDENCE OF

GENERAL INTENT

An urgent question for legal scholars in the 1930s was what effect
the various criticisms of legislative history's authority value should have
on the practice of statutory interpretation. The question was urgent,
partly because the New Deal brought many of the critics into the government, often as judges. Interestingly, the critics and those influenced by
96. Radin, supra note 68, at 407.
97. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).

98. See id. at 122-25 (arguing that the assumptions of positivism "played an important part...
in bringing Germany and Spain to the disasters which engulfed those countries"). The jurisprudential shift note in this paragraph is thoroughly traced and analyzed in E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRACTiC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973).

99. "[A] statute or a decision.. . involves two things, a set of words, and an objective sought.
This objective may or may not have been happily expressed in the words chosen by the legislator or
judge. This objective, like the point of the anecdote, may be perceived dimly or clearly; it may be
perceived more clearly by him who reads the statute than by him who drafted it. The statute or
decision is not a segment of being, but, like the anecdote, a process of becoming. By being reinterpreted it becomes, by imperceptible degrees, something that it was not originally." L. FULLER,
supra note 97, at 9-10.
100. "In a sense, then, the thing we call 'the story' is not something that is, but something that
becomes; it is not a hard chunk of reality, but a fluid process, which is as much directed by men's
creative impulses, by their conception of the story as it ought to be, as it is by the original event
which unlocked those impulses." Id. at 9.
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them rejected a return to the pure textualist approach of the nineteenth
century treatises. Jurisprudentially, it was simply too well-established,
for Realists and non-Realists alike, that meaning depends upon context
and upon the decisionmaker for scholars in the 1930s to seriously consider a return to plain meaning as the basis for statutory interpretation.
Influenced by the Realist emphasis on law as policy and a revived interest
in law as evolving norms, scholars in the 1930s turned the critique of
legislative history's authority value into a positive theory emphasizing the
purpose value of legislative history, its usefulness as evidence of the legislature's policy purpose, or "general intent."
Historically, there was nothing new about using purpose as the objective of legislative research,10 1 for Holmes and others had endorsed this
more generalized intent as the better inquiry for statutory interpretation
early in the century. 102 But the theory of legislative history as evidence
of general intent emerged as a carefully worked out dominant theme of
scholarship about legislation in the period from 1938 to 1949. The key
scholars were Professors Max Radin, 10 3 Harry Wilmer Jones,10 4 Freder10 7
ick de Sloovere, t0 5 and Lon Fuller,1° as well as Judge Jerome Frank
and Justice Felix Frankfurter.10 In the 1950s, Professors Henry Hart
The classic is Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 3 Co 7a (Exch. 1584), which posited "for
and true interpretation of all statutes" that the interpreter should consider:
What was the common law before the making of the Act;
What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;
What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth; and
(d) The true reason of the remedy; [Alnd then the office of all the Judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.., and to
add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of
the Act ....
Id. at 638.
102. See United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J.) ("the general purpose
[of a statute] is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic
may lay down").
103. Radin, supra note 68.
104. Jones, ExtrinsicAids, supra note 3; Jones, PlainMeaning Rule, supra note 3; see also Jones,
Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 969 (1940).
105. See de Sloovere, supra note 3, at 527.
106. See Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949) (wonderfully encapsulating the contemporary debate over theories of statutory interpretation); see also L.
FULLER, supra note 97. I shall quote from Fuller's article elsewhere in this piece, and a word of
context is important. The article is a debate among five judges over the interpretation of a criminal
statute used to convict several speluncean explorers in the year 4300. The views of Foster, J., are the
ones that I consider representative of the then-emerging Legal Process School, but those views are
attacked by other judges in Fuller's article and, hence, are not unequivocally endorsed in that
thought piece itself.
107. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation,47 COLUM. L. REV.
1259 (1947).
108. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527
(1947).
101.
the sure
(a)
(b)
(c)
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and Albert Sacks compiled their "legal process" materials, which synthesized the work of the earlier thinkers and set out in the classic form the
theory of legislative history as evidence of general intent. " 9 The Legal
Process school carefully reworked the earlier assumptions of legislative
history theory in light of jurisprudential and political developments (the
New Deal).
Thus, the nascent Legal Process school posited a modified positivism
assumption as an explanation of what law is. These scholars viewed law
as a purposive command grounded in collective reason. "The powers of
government can only be justified morally on the ground that these are
powers that reasonable men would agree upon and accept if they were
faced with the necessity of constructing anew some order to make their
life in common possible," ' 1 0 Fuller suggested. Hart and Sacks' materials
started out with a long introductory section laying out the role of law in
modern society. Following Fuller, their central point was that "[flaw is a
doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve
the basic problems of social living."'I These scholars applied this central idea to statutes, with a vengeance. As Frankfurter put it,
"[l]egislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an
inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government"11 2 Hart and Sacks declared that "[e]very statute must be conclusively presumed to be a purposive act. The idea of a statute without an
13
intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissable.""
Similarly, in place of the legislative sovereignty assumption, the
Legal Process theorists assumed a shared sovereignty, in which the three
branches of government worked together to yield legal rules. Thus,
"[t]he 'law' of a statute is not complete when the legislative stamp has
been put upon it; subsequent judicial decisions add meaning and effect to
the statutory direction," argued Jones. "The interpretation of a statute
109. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958); see Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and

Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 691, 693-700 (1987); Weisberg, The
Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983), for
more detailed analysis of the Hart and Sacks materials.
110. Fuller, supra note 106, at 622; see id. at 621 ("Whatever particular objects may be sought by
the various branches of our law, it is apparent on reflection that all of them are directed toward
facilitating and improving men's coexistence and regulating with fairness and equity the relations of
their life in common."); cf. supra note 106 (explaining unusual format of this article).
111. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109; see Weisberg, supra note 109, at 217.
112. Frankfurter, supra note 108, at 538-39; see Radin, supra note 68, at 398 ("The statute,
which is not a mandate of a supremely authoritative lawgiver who must be presumed to have used no
word or syllable otherwise than deliberately and advisedly, was enacted to achieve a purpose.").
113. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1156; see id. at 1414-15 (assume that "the legislature was made of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably").
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with respect to wholly unforeseen issues requires the exercise of originative thinking on the part of those charged with its application to particu11 4
lar controversies, whether these be judges or administrative officers."
Hart and Sacks viewed law as a process of "reasoned elaboration," in
which the legislature, through an informed and deliberative process,
would enact statutes which would then be applied in a reasoned manner
by courts and agencies. 1 5 The role of each body would be dictated by its
"institutional competence" to perform the purposive tasks of
government. "16

Finally, Legal Process rejected both the traditional assumption
about the essentially mechanical role of the judge, and the Realists' assumption that judging is completely creative, in favor of a policy-constraint assumption. Its theorists believed courts should be constrained,
but by policy rather than by will. In a democracy such as ours, the
elected legislature makes the primary policy decisions (and hence is formally supreme), but judges carry out those decisions over time and hence
develop the statutory purposes dynamically, but always constrained by
the legislature's original policy choices. These assumptions generated
Hart and Sacks' theory of statutory interpretation. Since "every statute
... has some kind of purpose or objective," ambiguities can be intelligently resolved, first, by identifying that purpose and the policy or principle it embodies, and then by deducing the result most consonant with
that principle or policy.17

Given these assumptions, legislative history takes on a somewhat
different role than it did under the assumptions of earlier theory. Thus,
Radin in 1942 backed away from his 1930 rejection of legislative history
by reconceptualizing its role. "It is likely that the study of [a committee]
report, when the general purpose-the ground design-is not sufficiently
indicated [by statutory text], will greatly aid in making the purpose apparent, as well as in discovering what other values are to be kept intact so
far as possible.""" The great advantage of legislative history was its abil114. Jones, Extrinsic Aids, supra note 3, at 761. "Another way of putting the matter is this: The
legislature cannot itself enforce the statutes. It must delegate that task to other governmental agencies-to the executive and his subordinates, or to administrative bodies, or to the courts." Frank,
supra note 107, at 1270.
115. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 164.

116. Id. at 3-4.
117. Id. at 166-67; see id. at 1148-79, 1200 (similar); see also Frankfurter, supra note 108, at 539
(judge must seek to effectuate statutory purpose, not any subjective intent of the legislature); Radin,
supra note 68, at 399 ("the task of the court is first to determine the purpose of the statute and the
extent that the discretion of the administrative officials or of the court is limited either procedurally
or substantively by the means which the statute indicates for achieving its purpose").
118. Radin, supra note 68, at 411. "But" he immediately added, "there is no legislative force in
the report." Id.
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ity to give effect to the supremacy of the legislature by minimizing the
role of the judge's personal preferences.' 19
Again, the classic statement of the use of legislative history as evidence of general intent was made by Hart and Sacks.120 They started
with the working assumption that "unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably."' 2 1 From that assumption, the judicial
interpreter should infer the purpose that such reasonable legislators
probably had in mind based upon the mischief that their law addressed.
"The internal legislative history of the measure ...

may be examined,"

the materials declared, but only "for the light it throws on generalpurpose. Evidence of specific intention with respect to particular applications is competent only to the extent that the particular applications
illuminate the general purpose and are consistent with other applications
of it." 122

Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Bock Laundry is a conscious invocation of the purpose value of legislative history, that is, its
use as evidence of general legislative intent. Recall that the majority
opinion by Justice Stevens invoked legislative history for its authority
value, implicitly making the assumptions underlying that theory. Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion scorned the majority's use of legislative history, explicitly rejecting the subjectivism assumption in favor of a textobjectivism one. All of the Justices in the majority treat Rule 609(a)(1)
as a simple command, to be obeyed however unreasonable (unless contrary to the higher command in the Constitution). Justice Blackmun
treats Rule 609(a)(1) as an expression of policy, to be interpreted in specific cases to carry out the purposes of the statute.
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun found the majority's detailed
reconstruction of the legislative history unhelpful, except to confirm that
119. "In a word, the more comprehensive and detailed the contextual setting becomes-through
minute study of the internal history of the bill and other extrinsic aids-the less subjective becomes

the interpretive process." de Sloovere, supra note 3, at 540.
120. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1179-1302, develop their theory of statutory
interpretation by a careful and detailed analysis of Supreme Court cases. Hart and Sacks are quite
critical of decisions such as Caminetti, which ignore legislative history, and generally endorse decisions which consider legislative history as evidence of the legislature's general purposes and policies.
Eg., Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904) (reproduced and discussed id. at 1180-86,
1200; lower court opinion reproduced and criticized, id. at 1165-74).
121.

H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1415.

122. Id. at 1415-16. Hart and Sacks suggest another caveat, that -[e]ffect should not be given to
evidence from the internal legislative history if the result would be to contradict a purpose otherwise
indicated and to yield an interpretation disadvantageous to private persons who had no reasonable
means of access to the history." Id. at 1416.
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the curious statutory language was not the result of careful drafting.' 23
Like the majority, Justice Blackmun found the conference committee report to be the key document. But Justice Blackmun read the report differently. While the majority emphasized the admittedly confused
references in the report to the effect of Rule 609(a)(1) on criminal defendants, 124 the dissent relied on "the underlying reasoning of the Report,
rather than on its unfortunate choice of words, in ascertaining the Rule's
proper scope."'' 25 The purpose for excluding evidence in criminal cases is
to head off "the danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial
by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his
prior criminal record,"'' 26 and that purpose is equally applicable to civil
cases, argued Justice Blackmun. Additionally, the overall purpose of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, "to secure fairness" and to ascertain "the
truth" in federal civil and criminal proceedings, is better served by rewriting Rule 609(a)(1) to afford the balancing test for all parties and not
27
just for criminal defendants.'
By construing Rule 609(a)(1) "so as to avoid 'unnecessary hardship'
and to produce a sensible result,"' 128 Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion reflected the teachings of Legal Process theory and might seem to be
a more satisfactory approach to legislative history in general. However,
the Legal Process approach of using legislative history as evidence of
general intent has itself been subject to substantial criticism. As previously, I divide the critiques into political theory, constitutional, and jurisprudential critiques.
A.

The Political Theory Critique

Some of the early Legal Process thinkers believed that the use of
legislative history as evidence of general intent substantially avoided the
political theory critique of legislative history. "Legislative intention, in
the sense of the purpose or policy embodied in a statute, is more often
123. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 530 (1989) (Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (almost all the majority's history entitled to "very little weight"
because Rule 609(a)(1) changed so often).
124. "The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant .
was considered and
rejected by the Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility. It was the
judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by
the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible."
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT],
quoted in id. at 520.
125. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 531 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 532 (quoting CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 10).
127. Id. at 532-33 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).
128. Id. at 535 (quoting Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933)).
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discoverable than is an understanding of legislators as to technical meaning or specific application." 129 Such a claim is implicit in the Hart and
Sacks materials as well as in applications of their approach in cases such
as Bock Laundry.
It is not entirely clear, however, that the use of legislative history as
evidence of general, as opposed to specific, intent really does avoid the
political theory critique. An important problem with the theory rests
with its belief that statutes embody coherent purposive policies or, as
Hart and Sacks put it, that "the legislature was made up of reasonable
persons pursing reasonable purposes reasonably." 1 30 In Bock Laundry,
for example, Justice Blackmun assumed that the Federal Rules of Evidence embody general policies of fairness and justice (whatever that
means), but gives us no reason to think that any members of Congress,
let alone most of them, had these policies in mind when they passed the
statute, or that they voted for the statue with that purpose, or any other
"reasonable purpose," in mind. The actual legislative debates on Rule
609(a)(1) speak just as much to the need to reach a compromise on this
thorny rule (so that the entire statute could be passed), as they do to the
policy embodied in the statute.
Judge Posner has questioned the policy value of legislative history
on precisely these grounds. According to his political theory critique,
reasonable legislators do not have the same public purposes that are
likely to be attributed to statutes by reasonable judges, especially when
the statute is a compromise between conflicting groups. 13 1 "[W]here the
lines of compromise are discernible, the judge's duty is to follow them, to
implement not the purposes of one group of legislators but the compromise itself."' 32 In brief, a reasonable legislator often has no policy or
purpose in mind at all when she votes for a bill beyond her own political
interests. Even when she does have a purpose in mind, it is not one that
she is willing to pursue at all costs, and it is usually limited by other
purposes she has in mind or is willing to accept as part of a compromise.
Judge Posner does not claim that his critique is applicable to all uses
of legislative history as evidence of general intent, for sometimes such
129. Jones, ExtrinsicAids, supra note 3, at 761. "A great number of the members of a legislative
body are likely to be aware of, and to put themselves on record as to, the purposes underlying a
legislative proposal; for argument in Congress ... more often reflects disagreement as to the wisdom
of general policies rather than differences of opinion with respect to technical points of construction." Id.; see de Sloovere, supra note 3, at 538-39 ("Not to concede the existence of at least a
discoverable purpose in legislative history would be to deny any relation between what legislators do
in enacting legislation as a body and what they express in the language of statutes.").
130.

H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1415.

131. R. POSNER, supra note 76, at 288-90.
132. Id. at 289.
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history does reveal a consensus in favor of a specified statutory policy. 133
But the critique may be applicable to Bock Laundry. From the perspective of political theory, it is questionable for Justice Blackmun to talk
about the overall purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it
had little to do with the deal-cutting needed to craft a Rule 609(a)(1)
acceptable to both the House and Senate. It is scarcely more meaningful
to rely on the purpose Justice Blackmun attributes to Rule 609(a)(1), to
prevent juries from deciding a case based upon their disapproval of a
person's prior conviction. The Senate didn't believe in that purpose at
all, for such a proposal made by its Judiciary Committee was rejected on
the floor. The House, which did believe in that purpose, was willing to
sacrifice it so that the bill could be enacted. Thus, all the talk about
statutory purposes just begs the only relevant question: what was the deal
cut in the conference committee?
The foregoing political theory critique challenges the Legal Process
tradition to offer a political theory that justifies its "reasonable legislator"
assumption. Because neither Hart and Sacks nor their intellectual precursors explicitly discussed political theory very much, it is not completely clear how they would respond. I can glean from Hart and Sacks,
and their intellectual heirs, three types of political theories upon which
they might plausibly rest their claims of reasonableness and purposivism.
I consider two of the possible theories hard to defend. The third (and
most plausible) theory is subject to constitutional problems to be explored in the next section.
1.

Optimistic Pluralism

The early Legal Process scholars wrote their articles during the New
Deal era, when the legislative process was widely regarded as publicseeking.' 34 In that period, and even more prominently after post-World
War II, it was recognized that interest groups played a significant role in
the legislative process, but that did little to disturb the consensus about
the public-seeking legislature. "Optimistic pluralism" posited that on
any important public issue a variety of interest groups, representing a
variety of perspectives, would form. After considering all the different
perspectives, the legislature would then produce a rational, purposive
133. Even such a critic of legislative history as Justice Scalia uses it for this purpose, as his Bock
Laundry concurring opinion suggests. See also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988)
(Scalia, J.); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
134. Pigovian economic theory, a leading theory of politics, posited that government existed to
produce public goods (those that would unlikely be yielded in the private marketplace).
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statute solving the problem at hand. 135 Hart and Sacks cited the leading
optimistic pluralist books of the 1950s,136 and it might be argued that
this theory of politics offers some support for their reasonable legislators
assumption.
This theory of politics, however, has been substantially discredited
over the last thirty years. To begin with, political science studies of legislator motivation suggest that rational legislators are not wholly concerned about the policies and public purposes of the legislation they
enact. The leading study suggests at least three goals for legislators: reelection; prestige within the legislature; and (least important for most) a
desire to contribute to public policy. 137 Public choice theory assumes
that reelection is the primary goal of legislators. 13 8 Legislators achieve
this goal, not by bold policy entrepreneurship, but by doing constituent
service and pork barrel projects, atroiding controversial stands, and
favoring compromises whenever necessary to defuse controversial issues. 139 A substantial literature explores other "purposes" a rational legislator often pursues, including loyalty to and influence within her
political party.
Notwithstanding this evidence, it may be too cynical to suggest that
legislators are relatively unconcerned with the policies embodied in statutes they pass. But it is surely blinking reality to believe that legislators
necessarily believe wholeheartedly in any statutory policy or purpose.
Because of the many roadblocks any statute must surmount before enactment (if it gets that far), the supporters of the statute must trade off some
of their policy preferences at some point to head off opposition or woo
undecided legislators. The resulting statute "tends to represent compromise because the process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is
one of deliberation and consent .... What may be called public policy is
the equilibrium reached [in the political] struggle at any given
moment." 14o
135. See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 109,
at 697.
136. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 727 (citing W. BINLEY & M. Moos, A
GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1950); id. at 739 (citing D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS (1951)); id. at 747 (citing V.0. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (4th ed.

1958)).
137. R. FENNO, supra note 70.
138. See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977);
D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
139. See M.

HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS:

A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS

(1981).
140. E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS 35-36 (1952); see E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 37-38 (1960)
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Finally, studies of the legislative process in the last thirty years
make one less likely to think that when legislators are acting purposively
and do not compromise their policies, those policies are public-seeking.
It is now recognized by a variety of scholars not only that interest groups
dominate the legislative process much of the time, but also that such
groups do not form in such a way that a variety of viewpoints necessarily
surround salient public issues. 141 Often, those relatively unrepresented in
interest group politics are the general population, such as consumers,
who are hard to organize effectively. Classic "special interests," such as
automakers and steel cartels, organize more easily and are, if anything,
overrepresented in the political process. Hence, the purposes and policies favored (and typically compromised) by legislators are often private,
rent-seeking purposes and policies, and not public-seeking ones.
To be sure, some recent studies of the legislative process emphasize
the "public-regarding" motivations of legislators and the public spirit
that permeates the process,142 but these studies are, frankly, more wishful
(or, as one of them admits in its title, "hopeful") than descriptive. And
the best of these studies emphasizing public-regarding conduct also emphasizes the virtually random and unpredictable nature of the legislative
process, and characterizes lawmaking as "garbage-can decisionmaking."' 14 3 It is doubtful that a sophisticated description of the legislative
process readily supports the assumptions underlying legislative history's
policy value.
2.

Proceduralism

Most characteristic of Hart and Sacks was their faith that good procedures would ensure policy rationality in the legislature. Unlike many
of their predecessors, Hart and Sacks were very interested in the legislative process itself and demanded that it be an "informed" and "deliberative" process. 144 Their further suggestion that "the best criterion of
sound legislation is the test of whether it is the product of a sound process of enactment" epitomizes the Legal Process philosophy. 14 5
("Congress has no mind or force of its own," because its statutes are at best temporary
compromises).
141. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); J.Q. WILSON, POLITICAL OR-

(1973).
142. E.g., S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1987); A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1984).
143. J. KINGDON, AGENDA, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984).
144. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at'166-67.
145. Id. at 715. They pose the rhetorical question (which suggests its own answer, I believe):
"To what extent should the legislative process be a rational process, whereby policy and factual
GANIZATIONS
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Proceduralism provides an illuminating context for the details of
Hart and Sacks' theory of legislative history.1 46 Hart and Sacks posited
three requirements for using legislative history in statutory interpretation. First was relevance: only those "aspects of the internal legislative
history which were officially before the legislature at the time of its enactment are part of its context." 1 47 Second was competence: relevant legislative history is also competent, unless the legislative materials were
inaccessible to persons subject to the statute.' 48 Third was probative
value: "the internal legislative history of a statute should always be...
used not as a separate and self-sufficient record of purpose and meaning
but in the light of other relevant materials, and with the object only of
resolving doubts emerging from the analysis of the problem as a
whole."1 49 In short, Hart and Sacks excluded legislative history that was
not part of the public process of reasoned deliberation.
Such an approach is sophisticated and useful, and the proceduralist
assumptions have great appeal to lawyers. But the theory runs up
against the "paradox of proceduralism": if legislators are not purposivist
to start with, and selfish interest groups form asymmetrically and do
much to propel or thwart legislation, deliberative procedures may have
perverse effects-thwarting public-regarding legislation but offering little
or no resistance to rent-seeking legislation.150 The reason for this paradox is that deliberative procedures create potential bottlenecks in the legislative process, which are most threatening to public interest bills that
either have little interest group support (useful in surmounting roadblocks) or have some interest group opposition (which can kill or weaken
a bill at any of the myriad roadblocks in the legislative process). Conversely, the plethora of procedures will be only a slight impediment to
bills supported by interest groups and their allies when the costs of such
legislation are not clear to the general population (hence, little or no organized opposition). The paradox of proceduralism is hardly an iron
information become the basis of carefully reasoned solutions; and to what extent ought the process
rather to reflect the relative strengths of the pressures of competing interest groups?" Id. at 716.
146. This is taken from id. at 1284-86, a "tentative restatement" submitted by Henry Hart for
discussion at the AALS in 1953. (With typical coyness Hart and Sacks merely identify the author as
"one of the editors." The same excerpt in F. NEWMAN & S. SURREY, LEGISLATION-CASES AND
MATERIALS 669-71 (1955), is identified as the work of Hart).
147.

H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1284 ("tentative restatement," section i(a)). Con-

versely, -[a]spects of the internal legislative history of a statute which were not officially before the
legislature at the time of its enactment, such as the uncommunicated views of individual members
about its meaning, are not directly relevant in determining the meaning which ought to be attributed
to it." Id. ("tentative restatement," section l(b)).
148. Id. at 1284-85 ("tentative restatement," section 2).

149. Id. at 1285 ("tentative restatement," section 3(a)).
150. Eskridge, supra note 53, at 289-94.
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rule. Public-regarding bills supported by the President or a major political party can surmount many hurdles, and private-regarding bills sometimes can be headed off by publicity about their ill effects. However, it
does make us doubtful about the usefulness of deliberation when the process is structurally biased.
Furthermore, realistic analysis of the legislative process suggests
that statements about public purposes and general intent made in committee reports and floor debate-the very statements that Legal Process
thinkers claim to have greater reliability than statements targeting specific issues-are often in fact less reliable. They are often just "sales
talk," put in the legislative history as a respectable explanation for the
deals that were actually made, and which may not be discernible. Just as
common-law courts will not hold sales personnel to puffery and statements of general opinion ("this used car will solve your transportation
needs") but will hold them to specific statements of fact ("we put all new
radials on the car yesterday"), so statutory interpreters might be reluctant to hold Congress to the public relations purposes touted in its statutes, while giving due credit to the specific representations and directives
set forth in the statutory text.
3. Attribution of Purpose
The Legal Process theory of legislative history as evidence of general
intent is vulnerable to the argument that it does not adequately account
for what actually goes on in the legislature. The theory becomes more
defensible if it is viewed as resting upon a normative theory of our political system as a whole, and not upon a descriptive theory of the legislature. Upon this view, it is significant that Hart and Sacks never say that
legislatures are in fact usually rational and public-seeking, and all the
statutory interpreter does is to carry forth the actual purposes and policies that animated the legislators passing the bill into law. Instead, they
do say that "[t]he first task in the interpretation of any statute (or of any
provision of a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed to it."1151 In attributing purpose(s) to the statute, the court "should
not do this in the mood of a cynical politicalobserver, taking account of
... short-run currentsofpolitical expedience that swirl aroundany legislative session. It should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears,
that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursing reason151. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1157 (emphasis in original). Those "criteria for
the attribution of purpose" are laid out in id. at 1413-17.
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able purposes reasonably."t 5 2 At several points Hart and Sacks explicitly
argue that attribution of purpose should at least sometimes consider the
53
entire rational structure and harmony of the law.'
Perhaps the best reading of Hart and Sacks is that even if they personally believed in optimistic pluralism or proceduralism, they did not
ground their theory of statutory interpretation upon such beliefs about
the legislative process. To the contrary, they grounded their theory on
the role courts ought to play in our polity, namely, the reasoned elaboration of statutes, at times making the legislative product more rational
than the legislature itself could have intended. This reading of Hart and
Sacks on the whole avoids the political theory critique but, of course,
raises substantial constitutional questions.
B.

The Constitutional Critique

Like the Legal Realists, Hart and Sacks readily admitted that statutory interpretation involves judicial creativity, "lawmaking" activity,
though they cautioned that courts are only "interstitial" lawmakers. Virtually no one in the post-World War II era is willing to argue that courts
54
cannot engage in any creative lawmaking when interpreting statutes.'
The problem is that Hart and Sacks contemplated substantial judicial
lawmaking. Their theory of legislative history as evidence of general intent contemplates that the best interpretation of a statute will often be
quite different from that originally expected by legislators enacting the
statute. 55 That difference will often be driven by judicial elaboration of
the statute's meaning, through statutory precedents, clear statement
rules, and canons of statutory construction. The judicial creativity envisioned by Hart and Sacks has been subjected to constitutional critique by
subsequent Legal Process scholars and, most recently, by scholars influ152. Id. at 1414-15 (emphasis added). This was a uniquely Hart and Sacks locution, as they say
also in id. at 1157: "The statute ought always to be presumed to be the work of reasonable men
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, unless the contrary is made unmistakably to appear."
153. "Doubts about the purpose of particular statutes must be resolved, if possible, so as to
harmonize them with more general principles and policies" of law. Id. at 167; see id. at 1416 (similar); see also id. at 1412 (clear statement rules "may on occasion operate to defeat the actual, consciously held intention of particular legislators, or of the members of the legislature generally").
"Can the body of statutory law ever attain any semblance of rationality and consistency unless the
courts continue unremittingly the effort to discern and articulate principles such as these?" Id. at
1241.
154. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of FederalCourts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985), sort of
makes an argument to this effect, though he admits exceptions, id. at 38, 40-41, and it is not clear to
me what his position actually is on the issue of judicial lawmaking.
155. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1203-17 ("new application of old enactments"); id. at 1412 (policies of clear statement "may on occasion operate to defeat the actual,
consciously held intention of particular legislators, or of the members of the legislature generally");
id. at 1415-17 (general purpose can trump specific intentions, and may create statutory ambiguity).
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enced by the Law and Economics movement. The critique argues that
use of legislative history as evidence of general intent is inconsistent with
the structure of our representative democracy. This critique relies on at
least three different arguments, none of which I find completely
successful.
1. Legislative Supremacy
Many of the Legal Process scholars after Hart and Sacks have been
notably reluctant to follow their apparent suggestions that statutes
should be interpreted creatively and dynamically. The central objection
is that the policy value of legislative history threatens to violate legislative supremacy, a central norm of our representative democracy. 56 This
57
objection was noted by early Legal Process scholars such as Fuller,
and has been a central concern of post-Hart and Sacks Legal Process
scholars, most notably Professor Reed Dickerson.158 It has also been a
central concern of Law and Economics scholars, such as Judges Posner
and Easterbrook.
According to the legislative supremacy principle, "although it does
not enjoy an exclusive power to make substantive laws, the legislative
branch exercises lawmaking that takes precedence over the lawmaking
1 59
powers respectively exercised by the executive and judicial branches."
A corollary is that in statutory interpretation, courts are subordinate
policymakers, "honest agents" who implement the directives of the legislature, or principal.' 60 "From that principle flows the obligation of the
judiciary to enforce faithfully the written law, and to interpret that law in
accordance with its plain meaning without reference to personal desires
16 1
or individual conceptions of justice."'
156. This is obviously related to Legal Process constitutional scholars' "countermajoritarian difficulty" with activist judicial review. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
157. Judges Tatting and Keen in Fuller, supra note 106, at 631-37, object to legislative history as
evidence of general intent on ground of legislative supremacy. I do not believe these hypothetical
judges represent Fuller's views, however. See supra note 106.
158. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 52 (distinguishing between the "cognitive" function, which
is the normal one in statutory interpretation, and the "creative" function, which is the exception);
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125
(1983); Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 292 (1989)
(court cannot interpret statute to contravene an apparent textual meaning that is backed up by
legislative history evidencing a similar specific intent).
159.

R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 7.

160. The principal/agent theory was developed in Posner & Landes, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975), and the "honest agent" term is taken
from Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword:The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (courts must be "honest agents of the political branches" whose role
is to "carry out decisions they do not make").
161. Fuller, supra note 106, at 633.
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These arguments suggest that Hart and Sacks' use of legislative history as evidence of general intent is problematic, because it expands the
ambit of judicial discretion. If legislatures do not really have purposes
or, more likely, have a congeries of purposes (sometimes in conflict), the
"attribution" of purpose by the judge to the statute is often going to be
judicial lawmaking rather than legislative lawmaking. By emphasizing
overall legislative purpose, Hart and Sacks permit judges to rewrite legislation to fit their preferences, and to overrule majoritarian preferences
they consider unreasonable. 162 In this way Hart and Sacks' emphasis on
legislative history's policy value may be countermajoritarian. This problem shows up in the Bock Laundry dissent. Not liking the unreasonable
compromise apparently cut in Rule 609(a)(1), Justice Blackmun was able
to massage a more reasonable result by relying on the "underlying rationale" suggested by the legislative history. Is this faithful to the original legislative expectations? A good argument can be made that it is not.
Hart and Sacks and their predecessors were aware of the honest
agent metaphor for the judicial interpreter of statutes but resisted the
conservative implications some have drawn from the metaphor. Accepting the policymaking supremacy of the legislature (the principal)
does not negate the considerable discretion that the interpreter (the
agent) should exercise, nor does it suggest that the discretion should not
be exercised reasonably and consonant with the statute's purposes. "No
superior wants a servant who lacks the capacity to read between the
lines," Fuller suggested. "The correction of obvious legislative errors or
oversights is not to supplant the legislative will, but to make that will
effective." 163 It is clear that Rule 609(a)(1)'s specific phraseology was a
drafting error,164 and so why should the "honest agent" not revise the
instructions in light of the statute's overall purposes? Does that revision
violate the supremacy of the principal?
Here, the ambiguity of the agency metaphor for statutory interpretation should be emphasized. Hart and Sacks' use of legislative history as
evidence of general intent is not inconsistent with agency duties for
judges, if judges are viewed as "relational agents."' 165 Most agents in real
162. See R. POSNER, supra note 76; Fuller, supra note 106, at 633-35 (views of Keen, J., in
hypothetical case of "speluncean explorers").
163. Fuller, supra note 106, at 625; see H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1146-47 (creative servant hypothetical as example of context-dependent nature of interpretation).
164. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1078 (1985) (given obvious "legislative oversight," interpreter should read Rule 609(a)(1) to create
reasonable result).
165. I developed the argument that follows in Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 319 (1989).
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life are in fact relational agents, whose overriding duty is use of their best
efforts to carry out their principals' directives to further the overall goals
of the enterprise. In making the day-to-day decisions for the enterprise,
the relational agent necessarily exercises considerable discretion, including discretion to correct apparently erroneous directives from the principal. In the real world, the relational agent can often obtain clarifying
instructions from the principal (although many decisions will still be
made without seeking clarification). Judges do not have that luxury in
statutory interpretation and must work with directives that do not contemplate specific cases that arise. Whatever their decision, they are exercising considerable discretion. Hart and Sacks make the reasonable
assumption that such discretion should be exercised to promote rather
than defeat the purposes of the principal's enterprise, even if that means
reaching decisions the principal originally would not have reached.
There is a countermajoritarian feature to the use of legislative history only as evidence of general intent, since sometimes judges will emphasize a purpose the original legislators would not have emphasized,
and reach a result that might not have been accepted by the enacting
Congress had it been put to a vote. But unless the statutory text clearly
answers the interpretive issue, even an agency model for statutory interpretation contemplates creative decisions by the agent as consonant with
the overall supremacy of the principal, who can always overturn the
agent's decision with a more specific directive. The effect of Hart and
Sacks' model is to shift the burden of inertia in favor of the more reasonable interpretation.
2.

Perpetuating Outdated Statutory Schemes

Judge Easterbrook objects to Hart and Sacks' shifting the burden of
66
inertia, in part because it perpetuates statutes that should be left to die. 1
His argument is that Article I of the Constitution gives each Congress a
life span of only two years. For those two years, Congress enacts statutes
as it can. Most statutes become outdated within years after enactment,
and courts are tempted to update those statutes to continue to fulfill their
original purposes. Hart and Sacks encourage this tendency. That is constitutionally questionable, Easterbrook argues, because it has the effect of
extending the effective lifetime of the enacting Congress beyond the con1 67
stitutional two-year period.

166. Easterbrook, supra note 53.
167. Justice Scalia has recently made a similar argument: "The principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature enacts a purpose, independent of the language in a statute, which the
courts must then perpetuate, assuring that it is fully achieved but never overshot by expanding or
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It is not immediately apparent that the limited tenure of each Congress has much relevance for statutory interpretation. When the Constitution was adopted, as now, statutes (if not their makers) were regarded
as having an indefinite lifetime. Then, as now, statutes were regarded as
ongoing enterprises. Then, as now, a leading precept of interpretation
was the rule of Heydon's Case, that judges ought to interpret the statute
liberally and reasonably to meet the "mischief" that the legislature
sought to "cure."' 6 To expect each subsequent Congress to update the
statutory schemes of earlier Congresses seems unrealistic, given the limited agenda of each Congress and the many procedural obstacles to the
enactment of statutory amendments. In short, the argument drawn from
the limited tenure of legislatures is, by itself, a weak constitutional argument against the use of legislative history as evidence of general intent.
The argument may be somewhat stronger in connection with an associated one, to which I now turn.
3. Liberal Principles
Complementing the argument from the limited lifetime of the legislature is the argument, made explicitly by Judge Easterbrook and implicitly by others, 169 that statutory interpretation should be as stingy as
possible, to minimize government interference in private affairs. In other
words, Hart and Sacks place the burden of inertia in the wrong place
when they encourage the growth of law. The inertial forces written into
the Constitution should make it easier for laws to wither away into irrelevance (unless Congress updates them).
Under this argument, our representative democracy, both in 1789
and today, is classically "liberal": it assumes the priority of private ordering over public ordering (extensive lawmaking is disfavored); legislative
ignoring the statutory language as changing circumstances require. To the contrary, it seems to me
the prerogative of each currently elected Congress to allow those laws which change has rendered
mugatory to die an unobserved death if it no longer thinks their purposes worthwhile, and to allow
those laws whose effects have been expanded by change to remain alive if it favors the new effects."
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
168. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1144, quote from Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep.
637, 638, 3 Co. 7a (Exch. 1584): "[T]he office of all Judges is always to make such... construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and proprivato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."
169. "Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that most social relations would
be governed by private agreements, customs, and understandings, not resolved in the halls of government. There is still at least a presumption that people's arrangements prevail unless explicitly displaced by legal doctrine." Easterbrook, supra note 53; see H.L.A. HART, LAW LIBERTY AND
MORALITY 30-34 (1963); Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 544

(1988).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:365

lawmaking over judicial lawmaking (hence is very suspicious of judicial
discretion); and pluralist legislating over republican legislating (laws are
isolated deals, not organic and continuing creations).170 Hart and Sacks'
theory of legislative history violates all these preferences of classical liberalism, for it expands and updates governmental rules that interfere
with private ordering, encourages judicial lawmaking, and often unravels
deals ("devil's bargains") reached in the legislative process.
The vision of government underlying this argument is controversial.
Historical scholarship suggests that the Framers of the Constitution were
influenced by both the republican and the liberal traditions of politics
and, hence, that the Constitution does not unequivocally embody either
tradition completely.1 7' The liberal vision also slights the evolution of
our democracy since 1789. Reconstruction and the New Deal have irreparably changed our view of government and its relation to private
ordering.' 72 Even though the rhetoric of politics often emphasizes private ordering, the regulatory state is such a pervasive and accepted reality that the critical bite of the liberal rhetoric is lost. Hart and Sacks'
theory is the New Deal applied to statutory interpretation. Even the
"Reaganomics" of the 1980s did not undo the New Deal in American
governance. One wonders why it should be undone in statutory
interpretation.
Moreover, classical liberalism itself is a political theory that is increasingly controversial. Critical scholars argue the incoherence of its
priority rules. 17 3 For example, liberalism's preference for private over
public ordering tends to ignore the interdependency of the two. So-called
"private" ownership of property actually depends upon "public" regulation, in the sense that the owner only controls the property because organs of the state (courts, the police) will protect her against usurpers.
And so-called "public" regulation of property rights typically depends,
in part, on "private" interactions to effectuate policy goals. Similarly,
the liberal distinction between legislative and judicial lawmaking is overdrawn. A legislatively enacted statute's meaning is dependent upon what
people predict courts or agencies will make of the statute. To call Hart
170. See generally Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007
(1989) (describing the political assumptions of "nominalist" statutory interpreters such as Scalia and
Easterbrook).
171. See generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985); Sunstein, supra note 90.
172. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures" Discerning the Constitution 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
173. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of

Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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and Sacks' theory judicial "lawmaking" is similarly misleading, because
the judge is in several ways constrained by the statutory language or the
legislative history, both written by the legislature.
C

JurisprudentialCritiques

The Legal Process theory of legislative history has an impressive
ability to elude political theory and constitutional critiques. The chief
vulnerability of Legal Process theory may lie in its jurisprudential assumptions, which are now being closely questioned. Critics focus on
Hart and Sacks' assumption of modified positivism, which is a mediating
position that may be hard to sustain. It is unexpectedly difficult, for example, to figure out how Hart and Sacks answer the question, "What is
law?" Is it commands of the sovereign (positivism), or is it rule of reason
(natural law)? There is support in Hart and Sacks for either answer. On
the one hand, the Legal Process materials emphasize that law is a purposive activity and that "[t]he idea of a statute without an intelligible purpose is foreign to the idea of law and inadmissible." 174 On the other
hand, the materials early on set forth the "principle of institutional settlement," which "expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly
arrived at result of duly established procedures for making decisions of
this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the whole society unless and
until they are duly changed" (their principle of institutional settlement). 75 Hart and Sacks demand that law be reasonable (natural law)
but also that citizens obey unreasonable laws until they are "duly
changed" (positivism).
Hart and Sacks see no essential incoherence between their positivist
and natural law features, perhaps because of their faith in proceduralism-deferring decisions to the most institutionally competent organ and
requiring deliberative procedures will ensure that positive law will be reasonable law. As my earlier analysis suggests, however, proceduralism is
an imperfect means for reconciling positive statutory law with reasonable
law. A good deal of political theory indicates that the deliberative procedures advocated by Hart and Sacks for legislative decisionmaking do not
yield purposive statutes, but instead yield statutes that are compromises
whose purpose does not go beyond the narrow statutory language or,
worse, statutes serving only the purposes of special interest groups.
Thus, in many cases, Hart and Sacks are faced with statutory com174. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 109, at 1156.
175. Id. at 166.
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promises that seem unreasonable. To resolve such cases, their theory
must sacrifice either its essential positivism or its natural law goals.
Under this analysis, it is no longer clear how Hart and Sacks would
decide Bock Laundry. They are highly ambivalent about violating plain
textual meaning but will do so when there is a clear drafting "mistake."' 1 76 It is reasonably clear that Congress made a mistake when it
drafted Rule 609(a)(1), but it is not clear what the mistake was and what
the purpose was. Justice Stevens, for the majority, thought that the mistake was in leaving out the word "criminal" before defendant, and that
the purpose was to provide the balancing test to protect those parties for
whom unfair prejudice might ultimately lead to the loss of liberty,
namely, criminal defendants. Justice Blackmun, for the dissenters,
thought that the mistake was in writing "defendant" rather than
"party," and that the purpose was to provide the balancing test for persons who might unfairly lose their case because of the potential prejudice.
Justice Stevens emphasized the positivist features of Hart and Sacks' theory: there is a special "oughtness" to the line-drawing apparently contemplated by the legislature, and the injustice of this line-drawing is one
left to the duly-established procedures for correction, namely, through
legislative overruling of Bock Laundry. Justice Blackmun emphasized
the natural law features of Hart and Sacks' theory: the specific legislative
command, and even the apparent specific purpose, of Rule 609(a)(1)
"ought" to be interpreted reasonably to do justice in the specific case.
This debate between the approaches of Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Bock Laundry suggests the indeterminacy of Hart and Sacks'
theory of legislative history. The indeterminacy flows in part from the
tensions with their modified positivism. Hart and Sacks give us no criterion for choosing between their loyalties to positive law and natural law.
Yet as I reread their materials, I have come to believe that if they had to
choose they would fall back on positivism, for they not only assert that
law can be unreasonable and that unreasonable laws must be obeyed, but
they also insist that the existence of a law provides it with some normative authority. Thus they say:
When the principle of institutional settlement is plainly applicable, we
say that the law 'is' thus and so, and brush aside further discussion of
176. For Hart and Sacks, interpretation cannot "give the words .. .a meaning they will not
bear." Id. at 1200. This precept is "a corollary of the proposition that courts are bound to respect
the constitutional position of the legislature and the constitutional procedures for the enactment of
legislation. Courts on occasion can correct mistakes, as by inserting or striking out a negative, when
it is completely clear from the context that a mistake has been made. But they cannot permit the
legislative process, and all the other processes that depend on the integrity of language, to be subverted by the use of words." Id. at 1412.
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what it 'ought' to be. Yet the 'is' is not really an 'is' but a special kind
of 'ought'-a statement that.., a decision which is the duly arrived at
result of a duly established procedure for making decisions of the kind
'ought' to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless or until
17 7
it has been duly changed.
This principle of institutional settlement is linked to Hart and Sacks'
claim that courts only engage in interstitial lawmaking. And it buttresses
Justice Stevens' position in Bock Laundry that the procedurally correct
way to change an unjust statute is by amendment, not judicial rewriting.
Indeed, this is sort of what happened in the aftermath of Bock Laundry. Within a year of the decision, the Supreme Court transmitted to
Congress a proposed revision to Rule 609(a), pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. The proposed revision applies the Rule 403 balancing test to
determine the admissibility of prior convictions of any witness (not just a
criminal defendant). 7 8 The Court transmitted the proposal to Congress
in January 1990; revised Rule 609(a) became effective in December 1990,
79
when Congress failed to defer its effective date or rewrite the Rule.1
Although this course of events yielded a pretty good result in the end, it
only deepens the legal process dilemma. The Court in Bock Laundry
held that Congress in 1974 intended that Rule 609(a)'s balancing test
only apply to criminal defendants, yet the same Court in 1990 exercised
its delegated rulemaking power to reverse the legislative intent the Court
had just discovered. All without batting an eye.
Although it is a position taken on faith as much as anything else, the
positivist strain of Hart and Sacks has in fact dominated Legal Process
discourse for the last thirty years. One consequence has been that their
endorsement of dynamic statutory interpretation through attributed general intent has been subordinated to their concern that judicial discretion
be limited. For example, the leading Legal Process treatise on statutory
interpretation, by Dickerson, marginalizes dynamic statutory interpretation by establishing a formalized dichotomy between a court's ascertainment of the statute's meaning (which he calls the "cognitive function")
177. Id. at 4-5. See generally Fiss, The Varieties of Positivism, 90 YALE L.J. 1007 (1981).
178. Proposed new Rule 609(a)(1) was reported in the March 1, 1990 advance sheets for the
Supreme Court Report, at cxxvii. It reads:
(a) General rule - For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
accused; .......
179. This is reported in the December 15, 1990 advance sheets for the Supreme Court Reporter,
at page c.
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and its assignment of meaning (the "creative function). 180 Even more
recent scholarship endorsing dynamic statutory interpretation bows to
Hart and Sacks' positivist fears of unlimited judicial discretion. For example, Professor Daniel Farber, a proponent of dynamic statutory interpretation, believes that legislative supremacy places tangible limits on
judicial discretion."'8
This analysis raises the possibility that Legal Process theory is not
much more than a sophisticated version of Mechanical Jurisprudence,
that is, that the goal of interpretation is to implement the preexisting
positive law according to objective criteria. Legal Process talks of the
positive law as policy rather than categories, and looks at more context,
but is engaged in the traditional positivist inquiry notwithstanding its
aspiration to make law a bit more accountable to reason. If this is so,
Legal Process in the 1990s is subject to some of the same types of jurisprudential criticisms as those voiced against Mechanical Jurisprudencethat it creates a false sense of law's objectivity, that it subordinates the
role of law as reason, and that it is a screen for oppressive social and
ideological structures.
1. The Interpretive Critique
On a practical level, the main problem with traditional Legal Process is its inability to posit a theory of interpretation which creates interpretive closure. Following Hart and Sacks, Legal Process thinkers
assume that most statutory language has an objectively determinable
meaning, and that determinacy can be achieved for the exceptional case
by looking at context, including reliable, competent, and probative legislative history.18 2 Legal Process theory rests upon a sophisticated theory
of interpretation, in which meaning is not always objectively determinable if one only looks at the statute's text or a few conventional sources of
legislative history. But Legal Process believes that by expanding the context to indicate the complete story of the statute's enactment and evolution, especially its underlying policies, an objectively determinable
meaning will emerge for any rational interpreter.
180. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 13-34; see also id. at 15-16, 24-26 (rejecting Legal
Realists' emphasis on the creative function; statutory interpreter is like an antiques restorer who fills
in a tiny piece of a vase).
181. "When statutory language and legislative intent are unambiguous, courts may not take
action to the contrary." Farber, supra note 158, at 292.
182. E.g., R. DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 85: "[T]he best working approximation of this actual
intent is the intent that it is most plausible to infer from the appropriate objective manifestation of
intent, which is, in the case of cognition, the statute as read in its proper context and, in the case of
creation, the statute as read in its proper context supplemented by other relevant and reliable extrinsic evidence .... "
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. This underlying vision of interpretation is appealing but ultimately
unpersuasive. i8 3 One problem is that Legal Process understates the importance of the interpreter's perspective.18 4 Different interpreters will
ask different questions of the text and legislative history, will organize
and analyze the evidence differently, and will bring different insights to
bear on the analytical issues. Not surprisingly, their interpretations of
the same text and legislative history will often be different, and their different interpretations do not result from different levels of rationality.
This, I believe, is what occurred in Bock Laundry, where Justices Stevens
and Blackmun looked at the very same evidence and came up with very
different interpretations. Both Justices present persuasive analyses for
their views, based upon "objective" evidence, and I do not believe that
either Justice was being "result-oriented" or "dishonest" (the usual law
professor's attacks). I find Justice Blackmun's analysis more persuasive,
not because I believe it is more objective and determinate, but because it
better fits with my own reaction to the facts of this case, my experience of
juries' reactions to such impeaching evidence, and my overall perceptions
about the best role for such evidence.
A second, related, problem is that Legal Process overemphasizes the
constraining nature of context. Legal Process tends to view context itself
as essentially static and preexisting. This view is naive. 8 5 The legislative
history of Rule 609(a)(1) is not a fixed context. Like the statute itself, it
is subject to interpretation. What the legislative history "is" depends
upon what the interpreter physically finds, what she then selects from the
materials available, what background values or assumptions influence
her reading of the materials, and how individual materials fit with the big
picture. In Bock Laundry, for example, all nine Justices agreed that the
legislative history supports the view (going against the statute's text) that
Rule 609(a)(1) does not require the possibly unconstitutional discrimina183. On interpretive theory, see generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: INTERPRETATION AFTER THE END OF CONSENSUS (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988); Interpretation

Symposium, supra note 95; Law and Literature Symposium, supra note 95.
184. "A sentence will never mean exactly the same thing to any two different people or even the
same thing to one person on different occasions." Hutchinson & Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes
(book review), 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 583, 593 (1984); see S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
(1980) (reader-response theory of interpretation); H.-G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (J. Wein.
sheimer & D. Marshall trans. 2d rev. ed. 1989) (interpretation is a dialogue between text and
interpreter).
185. J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM
123-24 (1982): "Context is boundless in two senses. First, any given context is open to further
description ....
Meaning is determined by context and for that very reason is open to alteration
when further possibilities are mobilized. Context is also unmasterable in a second sense: any attempt
to codify context can always be grafted onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a new context
which escapes the previous formulation."
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tion between civil plaintiffs and defendants. Note the importance of
"possibly unconstitutional," a value shared by all nine Justices. If that
filtering value were not held by all the interpreters, the Court might well
have split on that issue as well, because the legislative history nowhere
rebuts the text's indication that all defendants get the benefit of the bal86
ancing rule, and no plaintiffs do.'
A final problem is Legal Process' unreflective acceptance of the subject/object dichotomy.' 8 7 That is, it envisions interpretation as the interpreter's (subject's) retrieval of a pre-existing meaning (an object) from
the text. Although Legal Realism deconstructed that metaphor, it implicitly accepted the dichotomy, which it tended to reverse, arguing that
the subject imposes her views onto the object. Fearing the
countermajoritarian implications of such a metaphor, the tendency since
the 1940s has been to return to the original metaphor (but with some
flexibility for the object to change over time). The subject/object dichotomy has been philosophically quite controversial for some time,' 8 8 and a
more robust theory has been suggested by hermeneutics, that interpretation is a dialogue between the interpreter and the text, in which the interlocutors create a common meaning which does not preexist the dialogue.
2.

The Social Critique

For critical scholars, this interpretive analysis is merely symptomatic of a larger problem with Legal Process in particular, and any jurisprudence based upon classical liberalism in general. 189 Like other liberal
theories, Legal Process assumes that preferences are exogenous and incommensurable-there is no objective way to favor my preferences, or
interests, over yours (all is political). In a democracy, we accept the legislature's political decisions which favor and disadvantage interests, because legislators are accountable to the people and can be disciplined if
they make poor political choices. The legitimacy of "political" decisions
by unelected judges cannot be defended in this way, because they are not
186.

The CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 9-10, speaks flatly of the distinction between

a "defendant" and a "nondefendant witness," and nowhere does the report say or suggest that civil
defendants do not share the benefits of the balancing test. The report does, however refer to the
possibility of "persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal
record."

Id; see also 120 CONG. REC. 40,894 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis, a member of the

conference) (emphasizing application of Rule to defendant sued by government).
187. See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1154 (1985).
188. See generally R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983).
189. See generally M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); R. UNGER, supra note 173; Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:

The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
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accountable to the democratic process. Hence, liberal theories need to
show that judicial decisions are linked up to something legitimate.
Mechanical Jurisprudence linked statutory interpretation decisions with
the specific intent of the legislature, and Legal Process linked them with
the legislature's general intent.
The interpretive critique suggests that liberal theories, including
Legal Process, may never quite be able to escape this countermajoritarian
difficulty. In statutory interpretation, liberal theory demands that all decisions be traceable back to policy choices made by the legislature, but as
a practical matter admits that the legislature cannot make the case-bycase determinations itself. Yet once those decisions are delegated to
unelected judges, they will of necessity be making political decisions.
The ostensible "constraining methodology" they adopt will not significantly reduce judicial discretion, because the methodology does not capture what goes on in making a decision and is easily manipulable in the
hard cases.
Critical theory makes an even more telling criticism of Legal Process. It asks why all these prominent scholars expended so much effort
from 1938 to 1958 in creating an elaborate construct to support the "objectivity" and "neutrality" of law. The effort seems in retrospect to have
been an extravagant exercise in self-justification by America's elitesthat in a world of moral skepticism, our democracy was legitimate in
ways that Nazi Germany and Communist Soviet Union were not.1 90
"We" had a "rule of law," while all "they" had was "government by
bayonet." Of course, once it becomes apparent that many political decisions in America are really made by unelected judges, our democracy
comes to look more elitist and less procedurally defensible. The irony,
argue critical scholars, is that "our" rule of law was something of a fraud
in this period, when African Americans did not have the right to vote
and were segregated from the rest of society, when women were suppressed and often brutalized within the family and the legal system, when
gay men and lesbians were persecuted and institutionalized by a repressive medical-political juggernaut, when protesters were beaten, jailed,
lynched, and reviled. For many Americans, reality was more like
Solzhenitsyn's gulags than it was like Hart and Sacks' sanitized "legal
process. "
A critical appraisal of the lived existence of non-elite Americans
during the formative period of Legal Process deprives its proceduralist
190. This paragraph is based upon Peller, Neutral Principles in the 19 50's, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 561 (1988).
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strategy of much of its cogency. For then Legal Process is not only unable to demonstrate that judicial decisions are tightly linked with original
legislative policy choices, but (more seriously) is unable to justify its original deference to legislative policy choices. If the legislature itself is captive of elite interests (the pluralist game is stacked), and if many
Americans are formally or functionally excluded even from political participation, then it is hard to justify deference to the legislature at all.
What is even more remarkable than this startling conclusion is Legal
Process' failure even to ask this sort of question. 191 That is some evidence of its theorists' slavish devotion to the status quo and the legitimation of the privileged position of elites such as themselves.
3. The Natural Law Critique
The interpretive and social critiques contend that Legal Process has
failed in its effort to take the politics out of statutory interpretation (and
in fact may have submerged it for class reasons). In light of these critiques, it is particularly noteworthy that the 1980s saw a recrudescence of
theories explicitly recognizing the value-laden nature of law, including
judicial decisions.1 92 Hart and Sacks' proceduralism reflected a moral
skepticism common to Anglo-American law in this century: If we cannot
ensure the objectivity of policy choices (which Hart and Sacks shuttled
off to the legislature), we can at least assure objectivity and neutrality in
the procedures by which law is made and changed. New theories emphasize the normativity of law-the ability of law to contribute to a community's political development.
Consider in this regard Ronald Dworkin's distinction between a
"rulebook community" and a "community of principle."' 193 In the former, people follow the rules because they are rules; their legitimacy derives from their positivistic pedigree, including the accepted procedures
of their creation. In a community of principle, citizens follow the rules
because they reflect the great and admirable principles for which the polity stands. Dworkin argues that the rulebook community is a shallow
vision of polity, because it isolates citizens from one another and undermines the emotional interrelationships essential to a people's bonding
191. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223
(1981); Peller, supra note 190.
192. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); P. SOPER, A THEORY OF
LAW (1984); L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987); Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of

Interpretation, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded
on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1418 (1988).
193. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 208-15 (1986).
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into a true polity.

94

In contrast, the community of principle is a worthy

vision of polity. Such a community creates bonds of common concern
among citizens and encourages political dialogue that assures political
vigor and strength. 195

III.

THE TRUTH VALUE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS EVIDENCE OF

META-INTENT

Twentieth century American jurisprudence has seen the intellectual
rise and decline of two theories of legislative history, as evidence of either
specific intent (Mechanical Jurisprudence) or general intent (Legal Process). We are now moving into a post-Legal Process era which offers no
single, prevailing theory of legislative history (yet). There is a rich array
of theories, however, each of which returns to an earlier tradition and
develops it imaginatively in light of modem intellectual insights. One
post-Legal Process direction is to adopt the astringent positivism of the
New Textualism being developed by Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook. Their theory returns to the approach of the nineteenth century
treatises, which interpreted statutes by reference to the plain meaning of
the statutory language, the whole statute and related statutes, and canons
of statutory construction. Under this theory, legislative history is usually
irrelevant to statutory interpretation (legislative history as evidence of
nothing). 196 The New Textualism is an impressive theory of legislative
history. As Bock Laundry suggests, the current debate on the Supreme
Court is, for the most part, between the New Textualism and Imaginative
Reconstruction. Both assume that statutory interpretation seeks to retrieve the positive law put into the statute by the legislature. The two
theories differ as to their willingness to consider the more subjective features of legislative intent. Given the common assumptions (positivism
and legislative supremacy), I consider the Court's traditional approach
superior to that of the New Textualism. Intellectually, their common
jurisprudential assumptions render both theories unsatisfying.
A second post-Legal Process direction is away from positivism, and
toward the view that statutory interpretation is a value-laden process, a
194. Id. at 212.
195. Id. at 213.
196. The New Textualism is defended in Easterbrook, supra note 53; Easterbrook, OriginalIntent, supra note 24; SCALIA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SPEECH, supra note 22; and in the judicial

opinions of these jurists and those influenced by them. The New Textualism is critically analyzed in
Eskridge, supra note 6; Ross, Reganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399 (1990);
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89
Term, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277 (1990); Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
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search for "truth" or the "best answer," variously defined. This emerging direction I call Normativism. 197 Normativists believe that law is
more than the sovereign's commands and is ultimately accountable to
reason, that judges have a special duty and capacity for developing statutes in accord with reason, and that courts should engage in creative and
dynamic statutory interpretation. Because of its present-mindedness,
Normativist theory has tended to reject the authority value of legislative
history, and not to give much attention to other potential values legislative history might serve.' 9 8 Michael Moore, for example, has argued that
considering legislative history serves none of the traditional values invoked for it. 199 Yet his argument seems to assume that the only use of
legislative history is as evidence of specific intent 2°° and relies mainly on
the traditional critiques of that theory. Like other Normativist scholars,
he does not explicitly consider the possibility that legislative history
might serve other values.
Consistent with Normativism is the notion that legislative history
might have a truth value. That is, legislative history may be useful in
illuminating the best meaning that can be quarried out of the statute. To
be sure, we are not accustomed to thinking of legislative history as evidence of best meaning, but a moment's reflection will suggest the potential usefulness of the idea. Consider The Federalist Papers, the
newspaper articles written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay in support of
New York's ratification of the Constitution. They are routinely cited in
Supreme Court opinions and theoretical writings, ostensibly for their authority value or purpose value, as evidence of what the Framers specifically or generally intended the Constitution to require.
Yet all the traditional objections-and more-to using legislative
history apply with substantial force to The FederalistPapers.20 1 The es197. See Eskridge, Metaprocedure (book review), 99 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989); see also Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89
MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991). Leading Normativist works on statutory interpretation are Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); R. DWORKIN, supra note 193; Es-

kridge, supra note 170; Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 943 (1990); Moore, supra note
192; Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871
(1989); Sunstein, Interpretingthe Regulatory State, 102 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
198. See Aleinikoff, supra note 197, at 49-50 (Normativist theory treating statute "as if it had
been enacted recently"); Hurd, supra note 197 (arguing that statutes are not "communicative utterances" and hence showing little interest in their history); Sunstein, supra note 194 (arguing against
intentionalist theories and in favor of "background norms" as the key to statutory interpretation).
199. Moore, supra note 192, at 352-58.
200. The section of the article referred to in supra note 192 is entitled, "The Moral Case Against
Intentionalist Interpretation."
201. See generally A. FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY OF PUBLUIS: A READING OF THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS (1984), for the line of argument that follows.
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says represent the views of three people, two of whom were not even
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention. Hence, there is no rigorous
way to tie the authors' views to the views of most of the Framers. Nor
can the authors' views be tied to the views of most of the ratifying delegates, even in New York, much less in the other ratifying states. Nor can
the views of Madison in his essays be confidently attributed to Hamilton
(who had very different ideas about the Constitution) or Jay (whose ideas
remain largely unknown to us). Nor can the ideas of the authors even be
confidently attributed to the authors themselves, for the essays were, after all, propaganda documents, seeking to beat down anti-federalist objections to ratification. In short, any realistic analysis of The Federalist
Papers is devastating to their authority and purpose values.
Why, then, are The Federalist Papers so widely cited and relied
upon? One important reason is their truth value. The FederalistPapers
contain at least fragments of a political theory that has been robust over
time and changed circumstances. To be sure, most of the discussion addresses issues of only local interest or makes assumptions overtaken by
time, and therefore has little truth value for us today. But what is astounding is how many arguments seem just as fresh and interesting and
useful today as they did 200 years ago. For example, Madison's concept
that government should be structured so that ambition would counter
ambition (and that this is a good way to protect our liberty) was persuasive to many in 1789, and has been invoked throughout our constitutional history as an insight bearing on a variety of problems in a variety
of situations. This type of robustness (the ability of a concept to prove
useful in a variety of different situations) is some evidence of its truth
value.
While not penned by the likes of Madison and Hamilton, the legislative history of statutes usually contains arguments and ideas that are
quite productive of insights as to the most reasonable result. For all its
flaws, the legislature in our representative democracy has substantial institutional advantages in gathering and digesting evidence about the nature of national problems and possible solutions, affording a broad range
of relevant groups a forum to air their views, and engaging in actual
debate. Thus, Normativist theory would assume that the legislature has
(or is claimed to have) a meta-intent that statutory laws contribute to the
rule of reason and good policy in our country, and would posit that statutes should be interpreted to that effect. Thus, the Court in Bock Laundry should have examined the legislative history of Rule 609(a)(1), not to
discover what Congress has commanded the Court to do, but to figure
out what is the most reasonable rule for treating prior convictions of
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testifying parties in a civil case. This perspective may have been the driving force behind Justice Blackmun's dissent.
Normativist theory of legislative history as evidence of meta-intent
is subject to the same sorts of critiques as the other theories (political
theory, constitutional, and jurisprudential). Not surprisingly, the New
Textualists and traditional Legal Process scholars object that the truth
value of legislative history is a naive view of the legislative process and
gives judges too much power. In my view the most interesting objections
to the theory come from the third direction for post-Legal Process
thought, Critical Legal Studies (CLS), which in some ways retrieves the
iconoclasm and critical alertness of the most skeptical Legal Realists.
Though CLS has not dwelled on issues of statutory interpretation, at
least one critical objection to Normativist theories is that such theories
are insufficiently critical of ideologically distorted traditions.
A.

The JurisprudentialCritique

Like other theories of legislative history, Normativism makes certain jurisprudential assumptions that might be questioned. These assumptions are that: (1) law is accountable to reason, and a statute
without reason is not law (the natural law assumption); (2) making law is
a collaborative process, involving not just the legislature and the courts,
but the community as well (the popular sovereignty assumption); and (3)
for interpretive issues, there are right and wrong answers that can be
demonstrated (the best answer assumption). In this section, I shall focus
on the last assumption.
Normativism assumes that there is a "best" interpretation that is
accountable to reason, and not will or even policy. Obviously critical to
this enterprise is what Normativism means by "best" and whether the
Normativist criterion is jurisprudentially defensible. There is substantial
doubt whether Normativism can meet this challenge. Consider three potential criteria for truth: moral reality, coherence and integrity, and practical reasoning. The remainder of this section will set out the theories
defending these different criteria, apply them to Bock Laundry, and suggest problems with each Normativist theory.
1. Moral Realism
One definition of a Normativist "best answer" would be the answer
to an interpretive question which corresponds to moral reality. Professor
Heidi Hurd has proposed an outline for a theory of statutory interpretation along the following lines. Statutes cannot be viewed, under any rig-

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY VALUES

1990]

orous philosophic system, as communicative utterances, commands from
the legislature to the population. Instead of viewing statutes as "signals"
of some intended communication, therefore, Hurd views them as "signs"
of optimal social arrangements (moral reality). 20 2 To the extent that a
statute does not adequately reflect optimal social arrangements, it is not
law. 20 3 Hence, statutory interpretation is an exercise in determining the
optimal state of affairs for the case. 20 4 Hurd's theory does not set forth a
role for legislative history, though it clearly rejects any authority value
for legislative history (or for the statute itself). If legislative history were
to play a role in her theory, it would be useful only for its truth value.
Thus, Hurd's theory would be an interesting Normativist framework for
understanding the value of legislative history.
. There are a number of jurisprudential difficulties with Hurd's theory: few philosophers believe in moral realism generally (especially in
connection with social arrangements); fewer still believe that any moral
reality could be known by us; and I know of no philosopher who posits
that the legislature is capable of such discovery on a regular basis. 20 5 For
obvious reasons, I cannot explore these quandaries satisfactorily in this
article, but my case study of Rule 609(a)(1) does illustrate a few of the
difficulties with moral realism as the lens through which we evaluate legislative history (or statutes).
The legislative history of Rule 609(a)(1) is an illuminating debate
between two visions of the use of criminal convictions to impeach witnesses. On the one hand, the House Judiciary Committee majority, and
especially Representative Dennis, argued that the use of criminal convic202. "Thus, under the non-communicative model of legislation... statutes issued by the legislature are not to be thought of as commands, orders, requests, threats, promises, or any other kind of
communication whereby a speaker indicates what he or she wants done. Rather, statutes are to be
thought of as descriptions-not as communications by a speaker to an audience with the elocutionary intent to inform but, instead, as results of inquiries recorded by a uniquely situated observer."
Hurd, supra note 197, at 996-97; see id. at 995 (statutes are to be considered "signs," that is, "symptoms of conditions in the world to which they are causally related," and not communicative "signals"); id. at 996 ("legislative utterances describe legal states of affairs in a manner which, if made
under appropriate circumstances, may function as signs of the existence and nature of those
phenomena").
203. "Since on the model that I have sketched, statutes obligate citizens only to the extent that
they accurately describe the antecedently-existing obligations of citizens, statutes are sometimes not
law." Id. at 1025-26.
204. "[A] non-communicative model of legislation would call upon courts to interpret a statute
by seeking to discover and to achieve the optimal state of affairs of which the statute is a natural
sign." Id. at 1028. Hurd then goes on to make a statement which suggests she does not completely
endorse the implications of her own theory: "This is no more than a long-winded way of saying the
familiar: that courts should interpret statutes in light of the purposes that they may best be made to
serve."

Id.

205. See id. at 1000-06 (dealing with some of these objections, but fully aware that answering
them would be a lifetime project).
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tions to impeach a witness is unfair, because prior convictions (unless
they involved a crimenfalsi) are scant evidence of the witness' credibility
in a particular case. When a party is so impeached, there is a great danger the jury will penalize the party more because of her criminal conviction than because of the evidence she presents to the jury. 20 6 Dissenting
from the committee report, Representative Hogan argued that prior convictions are always relevant to impeach any witness, since "justice would
seem to me to require that the jury know that the witness had been carrying on a private war against society. ' 20 7 The House rejected this argument and adopted the committee's bill, but the Senate accepted
Representative Hogan's argument when it adopted the McClellan
208
amendment.
How would a moral realist approach this problem? There is considerable evidence that the Dennis arguments are the better arguments. The
Hogan position is the traditional one. It rests upon two assumptions now
considered quite questionable. The first is "trait theory," which posits
that each of us has a character consisting of a web of interrelated traits,
and that our conduct in any situation is driven by those traits.2°9 Under
this theory, we can predict future conduct from a character analysis developed from traits revealed in seemingly different contexts-someone
who steals a car in one context is more likely to be a liar in a different
context. 210 Trait theory is now considered highly naive by social psychologists, who believe our conduct is more dependent upon contextual
and interactive factors, and are skeptical of predictive theories generaliz2 11
ing from conduct in different situations.
206. See, e.g., CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 9-10; 120 CONG. REC. 2377 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Dennis, the main committee supporter of its draft of Rule 609(a)).
207. 120 CONG. REC. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
208. Senator McClellan's attack on the Senate Judiciary Committee's bill was very similar to the
Hogan argument, e.g., id. at 37076-77, and proponents of the Senate Committee approach made
similar arguments to those made by the House Committee. E.g., id. at 37078 (memorandum of Sen.
Hart); id. at 37080 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). The Senate ultimately agreed to the McClellan
amendment. Id. at 37083.
209. See generally G. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 339

(1939) (character traits "are not creations in the mind of the observer, nor are they verbal fictions;
they are here accepted as biophysical facts, actual psychological dispositions").
210. See Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PSYCHOLOGY REV. 481, 482 (1963)
(person who would steal in one situation would lie in others). But see H. HARTSHORNE, M. GAY &
F. SHUT-rLESWORTH, STUDIES IN ORGANIZATION OF CHARACTER (1930) (early empirical study
finding little consistency in honest versus dishonest behavior).
211. "Social psychology data reflect conclusions that prior convictions have virtually no probative value as a predictor for determining a witness' in-court veracity." Foster, Rule 609(a) in the
Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 32 (1988); see Leonard, The
Use of Characterto Prove Conduct: Rationalityand Catharsisin the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 29-30 (1986).
Professor Foster notes that most social psychologists now reject trait theory and rely on contex-
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The second vulnerable assumption is that juries, properly instructed
by the judge, will not overgeneralize from the prior conviction to penalize a party so impeached. This, too, is now questionable.2 12 Attribution
theory suggests that people tend to attribute their own actions to situational facts, while attributing the actions of others to trait factors. 21 3 As
a result, they tend to overgeneralize evidence suggesting "bad character"
and, probably, prejudge the impeached party's case. There is good reason to believe from scattered empirical and other evidence that cautionary instructions from the judge do little to counteract this
2 14
prejudgment.
The Bock Laundry issue is one for which there is substantial legal
and social science commentary, yet I doubt we can ascertain the morally
certain answer. I find the Dennis arguments more normatively persuasive, but have to admit that the social science evidence presented above is
still largely theoretical, and I have found no strong empirical data on the
precise Bock Laundry issue. The persuasiveness of the Dennis arguments, it seems to me, rests upon my own web of beliefs that are rooted
in the intellectual discourse of the 1980s and that, like the intellectual
discourse of other decades, may well be obsolete by the next decade. I
also realize that my receptiveness to these arguments is influenced by all
sorts of unproven assumptions I have made-including the assumption
that other things juries consider when they make credibility determinations ("demeanor of the witness"?) are any more reliable-and by my
feeling that Paul Green received an unfair trial in Bock Laundry. A book
could be (and should be) written on this issue, but I doubt that it would
discover a universal moral reality to solve this issue.
tual (situational) theories to explain one's likelihood to tell the truth in any given situation. Eg., S.
HAMPSON, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONALITY 63 (1982); H. EYSENCK, THE STRUCTURE OF

HUMAN PERSONALITY (1970); D. PETERSON, THE CLINICAL STUDY OF BEHAVIOR 23 (1968) (rejecting trait theory after ten years of unproductive research); Lawson, Credibility and Character: A
Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758 (1975). Professor Allport, the main academic parent of trait theory, has admitted problems with his theory in Allport,
Traits Revisited, 21 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 9 (1966).
212. "The law assumes that jurors have the ability, aided by cautionary instructions, to place
even highly prejudicial information in appropriate perspective. This assumption is belied by extensive, uncontroverted social psychology findings that serious distortions routinely plague the process
by which impressions of others, and consequent judgments about others, are formed." Foster, supra
note 211, at 32-33; see id. at 35.
213. See R. NISBETT & L. ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF

SOCIAL JUDGMENT 31 (1980) (people tend to attribute their own actions to situational factors, while
attributing the actions of others to trait factors); Alexander & Epstein, Problems of Dispositional
Inference in Person Perception Research, 32 SOCIOMETRY 381 (1969); see also G. ALLPORT, supra
note 209, at 521 (tendency of people to overestimate the role that one known trait plays in the
character of another); Foster, supra note 211, at 35.
214. See Foster, supra note 211, at 23-25.
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Even if it did, the book would not solve the Bock Laundry problem.
If the Dennis position were morally correct, the statute should be interpreted never to allow such impeaching evidence, and perhaps should not
allow impeachment by crimen falsi. Yet both moves cut against the text
of the statute and the compromise reflected in the legislative history.
Hurd indicates that a statute not reflecting moral reality is not law,
which means she might just throw out Rule 609 altogether. But such an
unconventional move might ultimately be inconsistent with her theory.
The optimal social arrangement for our society may be to enforce legislative compromises (this serves majoritarian, pluralist, and rule of law values). 215 If that is so, then a moral realist has to recognize the necessity of
compromise. What is the morally optimal compromise? Who knows?
Determining moral reality is hard to do, especially when talking about
legislation. The statutory interpreter has to figure out the morally correct answer to the problem in the abstract, and then has to figure out the
morally optimal level of enforcement to give to legislative utterances that
might not otherwise be optimal solutions to the problem.
2.

Coherence

Even lawyers and legal scholars who do not evaluate arguments
based upon moral reality do believe that arguments are right or wrong.
How do lawyers make such judgments? The main criterion is coherence.
An argument is better if it is more consistent with commonly understood
grammar rules, constitutional assumptions, or theories of social psychology, than if it is inconsistent with these sources. The leading coherence
'21 6
theory today is Professor Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity.
Dworkin posits that "integrity in legislation," which requires lawmakers
to try to make the total set of laws coherent, is "so much a part of our
political practice that no competent interpretation of our practice can
''2 1
ignore it.
7 Judges have a similar duty ("integrity in adjudication") to
"treat our system of public standards as expressing and respecting a co215. Hurd resists this idea, stating that legislation representing "political compromise" is entitled to "little authority." Hurd, supra note 197, at 1000. It is unclear what she means by "little
authority" (if legislation does not reflect moral reality, I should have presumed that Hurd would give
it "no authority"), and in any event she is trapped by the elastic nature of "social arrangement" she
is seeking to "optimize." If the social arrangement includes the rule of law values-which have long
been accepted by natural law theorists-then it might be "optimal" for the court to enforce a political compromise.
216. The main outlines of Dworkin's theory of law as integrity, as it applies to statutory interpretation, are set forth in R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at 45-86, 176-275, 313-54. See also R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469
(1981).
217. R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at 176.
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herent set of principles, and, to that end, to interpret these standards to
find implicit standards between and beneath the explicit ones."' 218 Specifically, Dworkin argues that statutory interpretation is like a "chain
novel," in which the statute and its legislative history are the primary
chapter in the novel, and subsequent authors (judges and agencies) write
new chapters. 219 The goal of the seriatim contributors is to make the
novel the "best," most coherent work it can be. 220 The judge "interprets
not just the statute's text but its life, the process that begins before it
becomes law and extends far beyond that moment. He aims to make the
best he can of the continuing story, and his interpretation changes as the
' 221
story develops.
Dworkin develops a coherence theory of legislative history. He
treats legislative history as part of our community's public activity. The
community of principle is shaped in part by the public values proclaimed
222
and relied upon by the legislators who deliberated about the statute,
and any public consensus revealed by the legislative deliberations carries
great weight in statutory interpretation, even though the interpreter personally disagrees with that consensus. 223 While Dworkin agrees that legislative history does not have the operative significance of the statutory
text, 224 it nonetheless is an expression of public values. An interpretation
that is coherent with the formally expressed expectations of the legislature is much better than one at odds with those expectations. 22 5 Unlike
218. Id. at 217; see id. at 225 (judges should "identify legal right and duties ... on the assumption that they were all created by a single author-the community personified-expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness").
219. Id. at 228-75; see Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 541-43 (1982),
reprinted in 9 CRIT. INQUIRY 179 (1982), and THE POLITICS-OF INTERPRETATION (W.J.T. Mitchell
ed. 1983) (Dworkin's initial exposition of the chain novel metaphor).
220. R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at -. The judge is "a partner continuing to develop, in what
he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Congress began. He will ask himself which reading
of the act ... shows the political history including and surrounding that statute in the better light.
His view of how the statute should be read will in part depend on what certain congressmen said
when debating it. But it will also depend on the best answer to political questions: how far Congress
should defer to public opinion in matters of this sort, for example."
221. Id. at 348.
222. Id. at 342- 47.
223. In discussing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (the celebrated "snail darter case"), Dworkin emphasizes that even if the interpreter thinks it best to protect endangered species at virtually
any cost, the interpreter ought to defer to contrary public sentiment, as expressed in the legislative
debates. R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at 340-41.
224. Dworkin makes the following analogy: Statutory text is like a promise, canonically binding
on the promisor (both morally and legally). Legislative history is like the explanation given by the
promisor. It is not binding (the promisor can act contrary to the explanation so long as she does not
break the promise), but does have moral force (unless circumstances have changed, the promisor is
acting more responsibly if she acts in accord with the reasons given for her promise). Id. at 343-45.
225. "[Llegislation is seen in a better light, all else being equal, when the state has not misled the
public; for that reason [the interpreter] will prefer an interpretation that matches the formal statements of legislative purpose .
I..."
Id. at 346.
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Hurd's moral realist, Dworkin's statutory interpreter "is not trying to
reach what he believes is the best substantive result, but to find the best
' 226
justification he can of a past legislative event."
Nevertheless, it is not clear that Dworkin's theory would resolve the
Bock Laundry puzzle any more satisfactorily than Hurd's theory. Dworkin's coherence-based theory is complicated by the existence of two different kinds of coherence arguments, namely, horizontal coherence, an
interpretation's fidelity to currently held policies and principles, and vertical coherence, an interpretation's fidelity to policies and principles of
the past.2 2 7 Oftentimes, fidelity to one type of coherence will mean infidelity to the other. Thus, the Court in Bock Laundry emphasized the
coherence of its interpretation with the traditional common-law rule,
Congress' rejection of a gentler rule for the District of Columbia in 1970,
and much of the legislative history of Rule 609(a)(1). 228 Although not
emphasized in the opinion, the Court's interpretation is also coherent
with traditional assumptions made about human character (i.e., trait theory). The Court's interpretation is on the whole supported by arguments
of vertical coherence. The dissenters emphasized the incoherence of this
interpretation with the modem trend in the common law to exclude such
evidence, academic criticism of the old common-law doctrine, and Rule
403 and the general purposes of the Rules of Evidence. 229 Although not
emphasized by the dissenters, their interpretation is also coherent with
recent theories in social psychology (i.e., attribution theory). Their interpretation is on the whole supported by arguments of horizontal coherence. It is not completely clear under Dworkin's theory how the
interpreter chooses between vertical and horizontal coherence
arguments.
This is a general tension within Dworkin's theory, and however
Dworkin resolves the tension, he subjects his theory to important difficulties. Dworkin's chain novel metaphor suggests a priority for vertical coherence arguments, because each seriatim author is required to make her
chapter coherent with all the chapters that have gone before, and to
make the novel the best one it can be. A preference for vertical coher226. Id. at 338. Dworkin continues: "He tries to show a piece of social history-the story of a
democratically elected legislature enacting a particular text in particular circumstances-in the best
light overall, and this means his account must justify the story as a whole, not just its ending." Id.
227. These two types of coherence are suggested by Dworkin's work and are formally developed
in Eskridge, supra note 41.
228. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) (rehearsing the arguments
in text and invoking the canon that "[a] party contending that legislative action changed settled law
has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change").
229. Id. at 530-535 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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ence may also be implicit in Dworkin's general observation that the best
interpretation must also take account of our political conventions and
expectations. If this is the case, Dworkin's theory is subject to objections
that it is too conservative. Many traditions contributing to a rule's vertical coherence are traditions distorted by gender, race, and class oppression and prejudice,' 23 0 and are perpetuated over time by little more than
unreflective inertia or outdated mindsets. Why should these principles
continue to control current interpretation?
On the other hand, Dworkin's community of principle ideal suggests
a priority for horizontal coherence arguments, because the community
will not feel integrated in its shared principles if many of them are shared
only because of an uncritical fidelity to the past. If this is the case (and I
believe it is), Dworkin's theory is subject to the objection that it is indeterminate and ultimately elitist. A central problem with focusing on horizontal coherence is that current context is infinitely elastic. The
interpretation in Bock Laundry seems unfair to me, because some studies
suggest it is incoherent with current views of social psychology. These
2 31
studies suggest that people will prejudge based upon a prior bad act.

Therefore, it is further incoherent with the due process principle that a
person's case should not be last simply because the jury does not "like"
her (the Dennis argument). But the Court's interpretation is coherent
with the principle, announced in much of the legislative history, that a
convicted felon should not stand on the same level of credibility as other
witnesses (the Hogan argument).
How would Dworkin choose between these two principles? I suspect he would choose the former (avoid likely prejudice by restricting the
admissibility of prior convictions), because it better fits his own view of
the matter.2 32 Because most people in America may actually agree with
the latter principle (that a convicted felon should not stand on the same
level of credibility as other witnesses), 233 however, his approach risks
substitution of the views of elite decisionmakers for those of the body
politic. By rejecting a principle apparently believed by many (I think
most) of the denizens of his community of principle, Dworkin's interpretation could be incoherent with the underlying goal of law as integrity.
230. E.g., Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387
(1984); Peller, supra note 187, at 1187-91.
231. See supra note 210.
232. In his analysis of TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Dworkin ultimately falls back upon the
interpreter's view of the best policy, and justifies it on the ground that it is not refuted by clear
legislative history to the contrary. R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at 347.
233. Indeed, if we believe the current social psychology studies (e.g., attribution theory), we have
every reason to believe that people do believe the Hogan argument.
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Intersubjective Agreement

The central difficulty with theories resting upon strong definitions of
truth is that American law rests upon a powerful tradition of moral skepticism. Moral skepticism is fatal to any theory based upon moral reality,
and undermines coherence theories. Nor does recent jurisprudence suggest that American law will soon abandon this tradition. If anything,
certain developments may exacerbate it. Much feminist theory and "different voices" scholarship argue for the contingency of values generally,
and the oppressive background of many values long treated as neutral.
CLS has developed an impressive analytic arsenal capable of deconstructing, trashing, and now even cannibalizing most legal or policy arguments. In short, any Normativist theory confronts overpowering
difficulty in persuading modem intellectuals of its version of truth.
Hermeneutics, the philosophy of interpretation developed in Europe, offers a more modest approach to truth and a sounder basis for a
practical Normativist theory of legislative history. 234 Hermeneutics suggests that truth is the common understanding reached by an interpreter
and a text about the case. 235 Every historical text has an horizon, or
context, in which it was fashioned (its legislative history, broadly defined
to include everything leading up to the enactment of the text), as does its
present-day interpreter. Traditional theory views the horizons of text
and interpreter as separate and distinct. The role of the interpreter in
traditional theory is that of a subject finding the object (the correct interpretation) in the text's horizon. Gadamerian hermeneutics views the horizons of both text and interpreter as more fluid, and suggests that
interpretation is a dialogue between text and interpreter seeking common
ground, a shared understanding of the truth of the statute as applied to
the particular case.
Hermeneutics is strikingly different from traditional theory, because
it views truth intersubjectively. It admits the possibility that the "best"
interpretation will vary over time and even among interpreters. Therefore, it refuses to accept legislative history as a static thing waiting to be
mined for the preexisting nugget that will resolve the interpretive quan234. Most of the discussion that follows is based upon my earlier work in Eskridge, Gadarner/

Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990). See Mootz, The OntologicalBasis of Legal
Hermeneutics:A ProposedModel ofInquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer,Habermas and Ricoeur,
68 B.U.L. REV. 523 (1988); Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135 (1985).

235. See H.G. GADAMER, supra note 184, at xvi (translator's preface: "Instead of the binary
implication of 'understanding' (a person understands something), Gadamer pushes toward a threeway relation: one person comes to an understanding with another about something they thus both
understand.").
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dry. Instead, a hermeneutical approach would use legislative history as a
source of possibilities and ideas which can be productively examined by
an inquiring interpreter in the context of the case at hand. Indeed, hermeneutics requires the interpreter to subject the horizon of the statute to
critical scrutiny (does it make sense in the context of this case?), and in
turn to learn from the text. Like any conversation, interpretation at its
best is a to-and-fro interaction of interpreter and text.
Although hermeneutics is a confession that Normativist theories
cannot realistically be very ambitious about their claims about truth, it is
a confession that may facilitate productive interpretation, as in Bock
Laundry. To begin with, hermeneutics reminds us of a central point of
statutory interpretation that tends to get lost in discussions of grand theory. That point is that the facts of the case are important because they
provide a testing ground for the assumptions made by the legislature, and
an opportunity to test the interpreter's own reactions to the text. Focus
on the record in Bock Laundry yields the surprising conclusion that the
verdict should probably have been left alone, because any error in the
236
trial court did not clearly prejudice Paul Green's right to a fair trial.

Paul Green at the time of the accident was an inmate in county
prison, serving terms for burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary.
While in prison he worked for the Lemoyne Minit Car Wash, where his
job was to operate machines that washed and dried towels for the other
workers to use on the cars. The Bock Laundry water extractor was a
large machine that dried the towels through a violent rotary motion. On
direct examination, Green himself told the jury he resided at the county
prison, where he was serving time for the two felonies. 237 His story was
that he was never given any warnings about not putting his hand in the
extractor, and that other employees had told him how to slow down the
machine by wrapping his hand in a towel and sticking it into the
drum. 238 The owner of the Lemoyne Minit Car Wash, Dolores Kelly
(not a defendant in the case), testified that she warned Green not to put
his hand inside the extractor, 239 and the testimony of John Emerick, another prisoner and Green's co-worker at the car wash, was to the same
effect. 2g There was also evidence presented by both sides concerning the
alleged defect in the extractor. The jury returned a verdict for the de236. FED. R. Civ. P. 61 (errors made in civil trial do not warrant new trial unless they violate
"substantial rights" of the complaining party).
237. Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Trial 11, 12, 12 May 1987, Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 86 Civ. 0688. Reprinted in Joint Appendix to Bock Laundry (No. 87-1816), at 27-28.
238. Id. at 33-34, 36-39, 42.
239. Id. at 83-84.
240. Id. at 96.
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fendant. On the special verdict form the jurors answered only question
number one, finding that the product was not defective. Hence, they
never had to answer question number four, which asked whether Green
had assumed the risk of accident by his own behavior.
On this record, I doubt that the Supreme Court should have decided
the Rule 609(a)(1) issue, because it is far from clear that exclusion of his
criminal convictions would have helped Green, who had a pretty weak
case and who testified himself as to his prison record at the time of the
accident. Nothing in the record suggests to me that Green was denied a
fair trial, although one thing in the briefs does so suggest. Green's brief
asserts that defense counsel in opening argument emphasized Green's
prior conviction for rape. 24 ' Assuming that this was in the record (which
it technically was not), how might a hermeneutical interpretation work?
Like the Court in Bock Laundry, I would apply a clear text, even
one with which I disagree, out of deference to the text (not to mention
legislative supremacy). The text is not helpful on this issue, but the legislative history is, because it reveals that the textual ambiguity was the
result of an oversight (Congress focused completely on criminal cases in
the Senate and probably continued that focus in conference), and because
it lays out for me the incomplete policy dialectic for this case, which I
can then complete.
Recall the debate in Congress over whether criminal defendants can
routinely be impeached by their prior convictions. The Hogan/McClellan argument was that a witness' bad acts reflect on overall character.
The Dennis/Hart argument was that introducing such evidence is inherently prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial. The conference
bill accepted neither argument completely, for it adopted a balancing test
(rather than the Dennis/Hart per se exclusion or the Hogan/McClellan
routine admissibility), and made a stab at limiting the balancing test to
certain players in litigation. Was the second limitation for the protection
only of criminal defendants or of parties generally?
Given the focus of concern in the late stages of the debate, Justices
Scalia and Stevens make a plausible argument that the text limits the rule
to criminal defendants. That is the obvious initial impression, until you
evaluate the rationality of that choice in light of the legislative dialectic.
Is it rational to treat criminal defendants differently from civil plaintiffs?
My initial reaction is that it is not. The Dennis/Hart argument is just as
241. Brief for Petitioner, at 11 n. 1, Bock Laundry (No. 87-1816). The brief notes that the opening arguments were not transcribed. Respondent's brief does not dispute the assertion. If this were
true, and Rule 609(a)(1) precluded mention of the rape conviction, I would find such an inflammatory statement grounds for mistrial.
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strong, if not stronger, for civil plaintiffs as it is for criminal defendants.
The civil plaintiff, like Paul Green, has the burden of persuasion, which
all but compels the plaintiff to take the stand. Indeed, in a civil case the
242 and then impeach her. 243
defendant can call the plaintiff as a witness
If the plaintiff's character is called into question, the burden is that much
harder to sustain for reasons usually unrelated to the merits of her claim.
In contrast, the criminal defendant need only rebut the prosecution's
case, and her refusal to testify cannot even be mentioned by the prosecutor. Thus, for the same reason the conference accepted the Dennis/Hart
argument for criminal defendants in some cases (the balancing test), it
makes sense to accept it for civil plaintiffs.
Just as the interpreter should not stop with the Court's analysis, so
she should not stop with the analysis I have just made. Given the extra
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants that are not afforded
civil plaintiffs (e.g., right to counsel provided by the state), can Rule
609(a)(1) not be read as another one of those extra protections? I believe
it can.244 By why should it be so limited? Unlike other extra protections
afforded criminal defendants, the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test carries
with it no obvious social costs that would make it inappropriate for civil
parties as well. 245 Moreover, there is an interesting symmetry to providing Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing inquiry to civil plaintiffs as well as criminal defendants. Both are often at a disadvantage in litigating against
institutions with more resources at their disposal. Therefore, the policy
of protecting vulnerable criminal defendants against possible undue prejudice strikes me as applying also to vulnerable civil plaintiffs such as
Green. Finally, I must confess great normative problems with the Hogan/McClellan argument altogether. In light of social science theory
and some practical experience, the argument has not been robust over
time and has been the object of increasing academic criticism. 246 To the
extent that there is interpretive ambiguity, I am reluctant to apply the
Hogan/McClellan argument expansively.
242. FED. R. EVID. 611.
243. Id. at 607.

244. At this point, I should subject the dichotomy in text to some scrutiny. Our system may
overstate the differences between civil and criminal procedure, and the Supreme Court is pulling
back on some of the extra protections afforded criminal defendants.
245. Thus, the exclusionary rule protecting criminal defendants against admissibility of evidence
wrongfully obtained by the state bears significant social costs, in that guilty defendants may go free,
thereby reducing the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions, fomenting cynicism in the system, and
in a good many cases subjecting the defendants' next victims to harm and injury. If a similar exclusionary rule were used in civil tort suits, some of these costs would be incurred.
246. The academic criticism is collected in Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 511-20, and Foster, supra
note 211, at 1-2.
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My dialogue with the text would touch on the other issues already
developed in this article--especially the concern that my interpretation
not do violence to an apparent legislative compromise. The bottom line
is that I would interpret Rule 609(a)(1) as excluding prior criminal convictions when prejudicial value to any party, not just to a criminal defendant, outweighs its protective value. Any mention of Green's rape
conviction should have been excluded (and I would have ordered a mistrial if it were mentioned in opening argument, as Green claims). His
burglary convictions probably should have been excluded as well. This
result goes beyond original legislative compromise, because I have updated the text's horizon by reference to the case and to current social
science evidence. This result takes me beyond my own preconceptions
about Rule 609(a)(1), since I would have excluded any such evidence if I
were writing the Rule. Even if I had adopted a balancing test, I would
have excluded prior convictions where prejudicial value to the witness or
a party outweighed its probative value. However, the legislative history
247
persuades me to abandon that view.

B.

The Political Theory Critique

Apart from jurisprudential problems, the various Normativist theories of legislative history as evidence of meta-intent (truth value) are subject to the criticism that they make assumptions about the political
process that are not realistic. A major problem for Normativist theories
of statutory interpretation or legislative history is that they tend to present a romanticized vision of the political process. This vision presents
substantial constitutional difficulties for Normativist theory if it cannot
be demonstrated that the vision somehow corresponds to legislative reality. Otherwise, Normativist theory would call for a great deal more judicial activism than most theories of constitutional law would allow. I
believe that Hurd's moral realist theory is most inconsistent with realistic
theories of politics, and that hermeneutical theory is least inconsistent
with such theories. Dworkin seems on the whole to be situated above the
political fray, but his precept of integrity in legislation is vulnerable to
the political theory critique as well.
1. Public-Spirited Legislators & Moral Realism
Hurd's natural law theory is not greatly concerned about the opera247. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 124, at 9. "The danger of prejudice to a witness other
than the defendant (such as injury to witness' reputation in the community) was considered and
rejected by the Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility."
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tion of the actual political process, but it seems to assume that legislators
try to act in the best interests of their constituents and are generally
guided by the "public interest" (optimal social arrangements), and not
just "private interests. ' 248 This assumption is probably necessary for her
theory, but it is subject to numerous difficulties: it is descriptively naive,
rests upon a questionable distinction, and is even subject to normative
questions.
Any assumption that legislators are motivated exclusively or primarily by a Burkean notion of the public interest ought to be weighed
against the substantial literature on political decisionmaking which
strongly suggests otherwise. 249To begin with, political scientists depict a
complex view of legislator motivation which cuts against Hurd's assumption. In his classic study, Richard Fenno found three motivations: reelection, power within the legislature, and contribution to sound policy. 250 Other theorists assume or argue that the dominant, or the only
important, interest of legislators is to be re-elected. 251 While this literature does not prove such an assumption, it has a superior predictive
power than competing models (almost all of which themselves make
more cynical assumptions than Hurd is willing to make). Case studies of
the legislative process reveal that legislator motivation varies according
to the issue, its public salience (media attention), and the array of interest
groups concerned about the issue. 252 The inescapable conclusion is that
the desire to be reelected is a substantial motivation for legislators, and I
think it probable that this is their major motivation in most cases.
The private desire of legislators to be reelected ensures that statutes
will reflect compromises and private interests most of the time. 253 A legislator who wants to be re-elected today needs to raise a lot of money
(usually by doing good things for interest groups), and to avoid antago248. See Hurd, supra note 197, at 1011 n.135.
249. Hurd's argument is that there are two schools of literature: public choice theory, which
merely "assumes" that legislators are only interested in reelection, and public interest theory, which
assumes otherwise. Id. at 1011 & n. 135. This is a misleading description of the literature. There are
in fact boatloads of case studies of specific pieces of legislation (starting with Professor
Schattschneider's classic analysis of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act), and there are several sophisticated studies of legislator voting decisions (Professor Fenno's work is classic). See generally W.
ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 48, ch. I (collecting literature). None of these studies is cited.
And virtually none of the actual studies endorses anything like Hurd's public interest approach.
250. R. FENNO, supra note 70, at 1 (1973); see Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 888-90 (1987) (updating Fenno analysis).
251. Eg., M. FIORINA, supra note 138; D. MAYHEW, supra note 138.
252. See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987); C. WHALEN & B. WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
253. The arguments in this paragraph are a summary of Eskridge, supra note 53, at 275.
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nizing groups of constituents. Thus the legislator will aggressively push
for pork barrel projects and other rent-seeking measures that profit important constituents, often at the expense of the general welfare. On controversial issues, the legislator will be more passive, out of a fear of
antagonizing potential donor and/or voting groups. The legislator will
support interest-group compromises or delegations to courts or agencies
of the most controversial issues (unless she simply runs away and ignores
those issues). Little of this activity leads to the creation of optimal social
arrangements, especially when one sees that politically salient interest
groups form selectively (and with a strong establishmentarian slant), and
that legislative procedures permit even narrow interest groups to hold
legislation hostage until they are bought off.
Rule 609(a)(1) is typical of the compromise nature of
most American legislation, and for that reason it is hard to argue that it is the best
rule for dealing with prior convictions (however one resolves the Bock
Laundry issue). Hurd's assumption has virtually no descriptive support,
but of course it could represent a "hopeful" normative aspiration for
American politics. Hurd does not make any sustained normative argument for it (yet), and to do so she would have to overcome the strong
pluralistic tradition in our society. Pluralism normatively defends interest-group politics on the ground that it ensures through vigorous politics
that our society will remain moderate and stable in the long run. 25 4 This
is a normative goal that may well be debated, and surely there are other
goals that might be posited, such as justice and fairness. But the pluralist
tradition cannot be ignored in any descriptive or normative debate about
American politics.
2.

Checkerboard Statutes & Integrity in Legislation

Dworkin's theory of legislation strikes me as a theory that carefully
avoids making strong claims about how the legislative process works, but
it also arguably assumes a more public-spirited view of the legislative
process than is justified by the evidence. For example, Dworkin makes at
least one important assertion that is questionable, though he may qualify
it carefully enough to avoid outright error. His "community of principle" sees integrity-the coherence of law on matters of principle-as an
important public virtue. 255 "Integrity in legislation" for such a community is the idea that statutes should not make unprincipled distinctions
254. E.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); D. TRUMAN, supra note
136; Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 734, 734-38 (1983).
255. R. DWORKIN, supra note 193, at 206-24.
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among citizens. It appeals to our aversion to "checkerboard statutes,"
which make such unprincipled distinctions. 256 For Dworkin, the best
theory of what our political community can be is a community of principle, and in such a community legislators will avoid checkerboard
statutes.
This claim is an oversimplification of our political culture. On the
whole, Dworkin seems to underestimate the role of compromise in the
legislative process. He admits that the community of principle might
rightly be willing to make unprincipled distinctions in order to get an
otherwise controversial but just bill through the legislative process, 25 7 but
the admission seems to assume that this is, or can be, somehow exceptional. Given our diversity of political viewpoints, the proliferation of
interest groups, and the many procedural roadblocks to legislation, virtually any statute that is enacted to deal with an important public problem
is going to include arguably unprincipled tradeoffs, such as exemptions
for certain groups whose support is needed, compromises and ameliorations of the statute's policy to attract fence-sitters, and secret logrolls to
buy off opposition.
Rule 609(a) is a checkerboard statute which makes several unprincipled compromises, starting with including the overbroad distinctions
among crimen falsi (always admissible for impeachment), lesser crimes
(never admissible), and important felony-type crimes (admissible under a
balancing test). Bock Laundry added a further distinction in the third
category, between criminal defendants and all other litigants. Dworkin
not only underestimates the frequency of this sort of deal-cutting, but
overstates our aversion to this sort of checkerboard statute. The House
conferees grumbled about its second-best nature, but all of the House
conferees endorsed the compromise. 258 There is every reason to believe
256. Id. at 178-84.
257. Id. at 217-18.
258. In defending the conference substitute before the full House, Representative Hungate made
the typical defense: I must say that, in all fairness, neither the House nor the Senate 'won' at the
conference. The real winner is the Federal judicial system. A spirit of compromise and accommodation ran throughout the conference sessions and enabled us to do our work quickly, yet thoroughly
and fairly." 120 CONG. REC. 40,890 (1974). To be sure, this might be just empty rhetoric, but it is
noteworthy that the House debate on the conference substitute was not at all strident (as it had been
on the House bill) and the bill sailed through overwhelmingly, suggesting general satisfaction with a
compromise rather than no bill at all. Even Representative Dennis, who had fought long and hard
for a rule barring admissibility of prior criminal convictions in civil cases, admitted: "So, while [the
final version of Rule 609] is not what I wanted to do... it is a good deal better than where we have
ever been, and I have accepted the compromise." Id. at 40,894. Representative Hogan, who had
vociferously opposed Dennis on this issue, agreed: "I am sure neither [Representative Dennis] not I
are totally happy with this compromise, as is true of all other compromises. But I think it is a
reasonable compromise, and it would be a calamity, in my view, if these rules failed to be enacted
into law." Id. at 40,895.
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that in the many instances where two opposing but coherent viewpoints
square off in Congress (as with the Dennis/Hart view versus the Hogan/
McClellan), and where the result is an unprincipled compromise between
the two viewpoints, the participants and the informed citizenry not only
accept the compromise but are happy with it.259
There are three basic problems with Dworkin's descriptive claim
that we don't like checkerboard statutes, because not only do we in fact
often like them, but we usually prefer them to likely alternatives. First,
as just noted, checkerboard patterns are necessary to enact most legislation. If (as with the Rules of Evidence) we all want a statute to get
passed, we are happy to accept unprincipled compromises. This is a.
much bigger limitation than Dworkin seems willing to admit. Second,
this problem usually gets worse over time, as new compromises accumulate and old ones rarely get repealed. The persistence of old, and often
obsolescent checkerboard compromises is due to legislative inertia, the
difficulty to repeal, the pull of vertical coherence and tradition in our
instincts, reliance interests, and our greater reluctance to take things
away from people than to give them new things. Third, our different
intensities of preference make us much more receptive to checkerboard
statutes than Dworkin seems to think. Most Americans are happier with
a system in which their most intense preferences are satisfied, usually
through a checkerboard statute or checkerboard pattern of implementation, even at the price of satisfying other people's most intense preferences in a similar way. For all its normative problems, eloquently
articulated by Dworkin, this is one great advantage of the pluralist political process. Dworkin has not demonstrated that he understands "our
instincts" 260 better than pluralism does.
3.

Hermeneutics and a Realistic View of Politics

The foregoing analysis suggests that Normativist theories of legislative history resting upon strong definitions of truth tend to accept a romantic, even utopian, view of politics that is today quite untenable.
Compromise and willingness to give up the best for the good are inherent
in our political system. Obviously, that is not fatal to Normativist theory. Dworkin and Hurd might ultimately conclude that their theory
seeks to transform our political system, or encourage judges to make it
better. 26' However, that attempt would greatly exacerbate the constitu259. Dworkin concedes this possibility in R.

DWORKIN,

supra note 193, at 179-83.

260. Id. at 182.

261. The latter strategy, unhappily, encounters many of the same objections, based on a realistic
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tional problems suggested in the next section.
Hermeneutics suggests a more modest approach. Compromise,
rather than moral reality or integrity, is inherent in the process of interpretation just as in the process of legislation. Practical reasoning means
sometimes avoiding an interpretation when the case does not call for one
(no prejudicial error in Bock Laundry), accepting most of the text's policy judgments and unprincipled distinctions even while questioning
others (Rule 609(a)(1)'s questionable distinction between defendants and
other parties or witnesses), and working out the truth one case at a time
rather than from a grand system. The weak Normativist theory inspired
by hermeneutics might be said to carry forth into the future the discussions behind legislative compromises, and therefore, to preserve the main
goals of pluralism, but with greater appreciation for the competing goals
of coherence, justice, and fairness (Dworkin's very appealing triad of
goals).
C.

The ConstitutionalCritique

In my view, the political theory critique of Normativist theories of
legislative history pushes those theories toward the admission that interpreters take a strong role, transforming intractable materials in the direction of the normative goal (moral realism, law's integrity). Dworkin, for
example, revealingly calls his interpreter Hercules, and strikingly contrasts him to the nameless legislators who form the background chorus in
his work. Hurd is willing to go further. To her moral realist judge,
"[legislation that is backed only by log-rolling, political compromises, or
self-interest on the part of legislators will thus be entitled to little authority."' 262 In short, Hercules and the moral realist would, if they really
took these theories to heart, completely rewrite Rule 609(a)(1).
Such a strong role for nonelected interpreters (judges) might be criticized as judicial usurpation of the legislature's role, and therefore contrary to legislative supremacy. 26 3 I think this constitutional critique has
greater force against Hurd and Dworkin than it does against Hart and
Sacks, or against a hermeneutical theory of the role of legislative history
in interpretation. Nonetheless Dworkin and Hurd can rely on some of
the same arguments that have been advanced for the legitimacy of Hart
and Sacks' approach.
view of the power politics involved in judging. See, e.g., Rubin, Common Law andStatute Law, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982).
262. Hurd, supra note 197, at 1000.
263. The best explication of this rule is Farber, supra note 158, at 281.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:365

To begin with, it is not clear that the Constitution subordinates the
role of the judiciary to one of the agents doing the bidding of congressional principals. The division of governmental power into three coequal, coordinate branches of government by Articles I-III, in fact, suggest otherwise-that judges interpreting statutes are more like "partners"
with the legislature and the executive in the ongoing enterprise of government, than they are like "agents" implementing the directives of the legislative principal. As the Realists argued, 264 the partnership metaphor
makes sense of the constitutional separation of powers, in which the legislature writes statutes and courts interpret them.
Additionally, the new jurisprudence of interpretation provides fresh
support for the partnership metaphor. Hermeneutics suggests that interpretation---especially legal interpretation-is inevitably an interaction, a
dialogue, between the text and the interpreter. If approached in the
proper spirit of openness and inquiry, the conversation is one in which
neither perspective is dominant. The result of the conversation is truly
collaborative. It creates a common ground between the interlocutors. If
hermeneutics is right about the essential nature of interpretation, the Realist notion that judges are partners in government has great force.
Of course, the objection remains that Dworkin's Hercules and
Hurd's moral realist end up being a great deal more than just partners
with the legislature. Their theories threaten to liquidate the partnership
and replace it with a proprietorship of the judiciary. I think they would
respond by emphasizing the partner's ultimate duty to the goals of the
enterprise-moral realism or integrity. Note, further, that even if one
rejects the partnership metaphor for statutory interpretation, and falls
back on the agency one, the legitimacy of the truth value is not necessarily lost.
Our interpreter as partner in this context is operationally similar to
the relational agent. While we might say (as I did above) that the relational agent carries out the principal's orders creatively, there is a strong
sense in which relational agents-like partners-are judged by the truth
of their decisions. The relational agent who slavishly follows the letter
and even the spirit of the principal's orders into heavy business losses will
probably be fired (and in my view ought to be), just as the partner who
mechanically carries out the enterprise into bankruptcy will be shunned
by businesses in the future. Conversely, the relational agent who
stretches the principal's order to snatch up a business opportunity is
often (albeit not always) rewarded, and the partner who stretches the
264. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
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partnership goals when business necessity demands it will be a soughtafter associate. The point is that all these actors are ultimately and properly judged mainly on the basis of their ability to make the relationship
work productively-their ability to see the truth of the situation. So too
it might be with judges. It should not be unconstitutional for them to
find the truth of the situation and implement it, within statutory
conventions.
CONCLUSION

This Article identifies three values that legislative history might
serve for the statutory interpreter: (1) authority value, as evidence of the
legislature's specific and authoritative intent when it enacted the statute;
(2) purpose value, as evidence of the legislature's general intent, its policy
goal or purpose; and (3) truth value, as evidence of the legislature's metaintent that statutes contribute to the constructive development of law.
My analysis seeks to identify the jurisprudential evolution in academic
theorizing about legislative history. Where does all this analysis leave
us?
On the one hand, it provides some (but not unequivocal) support for
the New Textualist critique of legislative history. Legislative history's
most commonly invoked value, as evidence of specific legislative intent, is
the most vulnerable to a wide variety of critiques. Other more recently
emphasized values are also subject to question. Thus, the New Textualists have plenty of arguments for their position that legislative history is
of questionable value. The problem my analysis presents for them, however, is that several of the criticisms of legislative history values (especially the jurisprudential criticisms) can also be invoked against the New
Textualism.
On the other hand, my analysis also provides some support for the
more eclectic approach of Practical Legal Studies. 265 That school, of
which I am sort of an ad hoc member, would argue that legislative history can serve any or all of these values depending on the case. Recall
my example of The Federalist Papers.266 Notwithstanding significant
theoretical objections to their invocation, they often provide very practical guidance for very simple reasons, and the same can be said for the
legislative history of many statutes. Just as Madison's essays carry some
265. See Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 724
(1989) (correspondence describing a centrist movement Professor Feinman dubs "Practical Legal
Studies," or "PLS" for short [compare "CLS"].
266. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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weight simply because they were written by someone who helped draft
the Constitution, so some legislative history has some authoritative force
in argumentation. Just as the Federalist's defenses of constitutional
choices are often persuasive evidence of constitutional policies, so legislative history can sometimes provide guidance to the statutory interpreter
by giving an indication of widely shared designs. And just as the essays
by Madison and Hamilton set forth insightful views about political theory, legislative history is often illuminating for its normative value. An
interpreter's study of legislative history serves a variety of values and, at
bottom, ought to resist pressures to conform to a procrustean theoretical
framework. The pragmatic lesson for my historical exegesis is that dogmatic positions on the use of legislative history are not productive in our
representative democracy.

